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CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC:
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND RECONCILIATION
IN RWANDA'S COFFEE SECTOR
KAROL C. BOUDREAUX AND PUJA AHLUWALIA*
I. INTRODUCTION
In some countries, particular industries play especially important roles. In the
United States, for example, the automotive industry has provided hundreds of
thousands of jobs and helped shape the image of America as the land of the
automobile.' More recently, the computer industry has helped create a new image
of the U.S. as a high-tech, well-connected service economy.2 These industries
have contributed to the development of an "American identity."
Coffee has played a unique role in Rwanda's development. For decades,
coffee has been Rwanda's top export and chief source of foreign exchange.
3
Thousands of Rwandans have been involved in coffee's cultivation and sale. In
the twenty-first century, the industry continues to provide a livelihood for some
500,000 Rwandan families,4 many of whom work in cooperatives and grow coffee
on small plots on the country's hillsides.5
. Karol C. Boudreaux is senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason
University. Puja Ahluwalia is a J.D. candidate at Stanford Law School. We extend sincere thanks to
Jutta Tobias. Without her hard work, vision, and excellent organization skills the survey work in
Rwanda would not have been possible. We also express appreciation for her comments on an earlier
draft. We thank Albert Nsengiyumva, Rama Rao, Tim Schilling, Edwige Musabe, Anasthase Shyaka,
and Gerald Rwagasana for their support, contributions, and help in Rwanda. A special note of thanks to
the wonderful students from the National University of Rwanda who administered our survey in the
field with creativity and care. Thanks to Daniel Sacks for his continued thoughtful assistance in the US.
Any errors are ours alone.
1. Kathy E1-Messidi, MSN ENCARTA, Automobile Industry, http://encarta.msn.com (last visited
Feb. 28, 2009) (type "'automobile industry" into the search bar).
2. Andrew Pollack, Japanese Portables Threaten American Lead in Computers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1990, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res-9COCE7DB I530F937A157
52C IA966958260&sec=&spon = .
3. Coffee: Rwanda, 43(8) AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN: ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND
TECHNICAL SERIES 17090B (2006): see also Government of Rwanda, Agricultural Production: Tea and
Coffee. http://www.minagri.gov.rw/article.php3?id-article = 22 (June 10, 2006).
4. Project Rwanda, The Coffee Bike, http://projectrwanda.org/The-Coffee-Bike.php (last visited
Nov. 13, 2008): Green Living Project, SPREAD, Rwanda: Coffee Awakens a National Economy, (Apr.
19, 2008), http://www.greenlivingproject.com/spread-rvanda-coffee-wakes-up-a-national-economy/.
5. RESEARCH INTO USE, RWANDA MIL SCOPING VISIT REPORT 9 (2007), available at
http://www.researchintouse.com/h'downloads/Rwanda_-_MILScoping-Study_- Apr_07.pdf.
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Over the past decade, the coffee sector has been transformed from a highly
controlled, politicized industry to one that is liberalized and quickly developing a
prized niche product: specialty coffee. Rwandans have successfully built a
reputation for quality that buyers in the U.S., Europe, and Asia recognize. These
changes are translating into increased income and greater economic empowerment
for some Rwandan farmers.6
In addition to improving incomes, the liberalized coffee sector increases
opportunities for commercial cooperation among Hutus and Tutsis. Smallholders
are now free to sell their coffee on world markets at prices they negotiate, creating
incentives to form cooperatives in order to benefit from economies of scale
7
Because smallholders retain profits from coffee sales, they also have incentives to
work together to improve the quality of their product. And because coffee in
Rwanda is grown by smallholders, who make up the vast majority of the
population (90%) 8, liberalized coffee policies have the potential to benefit many
Rwandans - Hutus as well as Tutsis.
Rwanda's coffee liberalization, therefore, is likely different from
liberalizations that benefit elites (such as Russian privatizations or Kenya land
titling reforms). 9 It is, to date, an inclusive reform with positive distributional
effects. Because coffee-sector liberalization has raised income, rather than costs,
for the rural poor, this liberalization is less likely to promote conflict than
liberalizations where costs are spread widely (such as the removal of subsidies)
and benefits are narrowly concentrated (such as many privatizations).,
0 We note
that this is an issue that requires further research."'
Journalistic evidence suggests that commercial cooperation exists among
Hutu and Tutsi members of coffee cooperatives and that this cooperation may
contribute to informal reconciliation.
12  In June 2008, we sponsored and
participated in exploratory survey work in Rwanda to investigate this issue. Over
ten days, 235 smallholder farmers and employees at coffee washing stations
6. USAID, FrontLines, Mission of the Month: Rwanda (Apr. 2006),
http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl-aprO6/dialogue.htm.
7. RUKAZAMBUGA NTIRUSHWA T. DANIEL, DRAFT REPORT ON AGRICULTURAL 
INNOVATION
AND TECHNOLOGY IN AFRICA: RWANDA ExPERIENCE 14 (2008), 
available at
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/243550/RwandaInnovationStudyreport.pdf
8. Id. at 6.
9. See E. Sam Overman, Privatization in China, Mexico, & Russia. A Comparative Study, 19 (1),
PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT REV. 46, 55 (1995) ("Only two groups appear to have the domestic
capital that could finance privatization. One group is the established political elite and the party
bureaucracy.").
10. Jonathan Morduch et al., Distributional Consequences of the Russian Price Liberalization, 42
(3), ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 469,469 (1994).
11. See PAUL COLLIER ET AL., BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL WAR & DEVELOPMENT
POLICY 53 (Oxford University Press, 2003) (arguing that "the key root cause of conflict is the failure 
of
economic development. Countries with low, stagnant, and unequally distributed per capita incomes that
have remained dependent on primary commodities for their exports face dangerously high risks of
prolonged conflict.") Rwanda pre-199
4 fits this description and, to a large extent, still does.
12. See infra Part VII.
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completed surveys regarding their attitudes toward reconciliation, among other
issues. 13  Results from these surveys are encouraging, if not dispositive:
membership in a coffee cooperative, as well as longer-term association with a
coffee washing station, and economic and general life satisfaction are significantly
correlated to positive attitudes towards reconciliation. 14  Farmers we surveyed
reported an increased willingness to engage in socially inclusive behavior today in
comparison to the past. Members of cooperatives were less likely to report high
distrust than workers not associated with a cooperative. With respect to material
prosperity, farmers are earning more for their coffee beans today than they were in
the past and are reporting greater economic satisfaction compared to five years
ago.
15
Changes in levels of economic satisfaction stem in part from income earned
through the sale of specialty coffee. Farmers who earn more from the sale of
coffee, and who work together with others in cooperatives (or at private washing
stations), express an improvement in the way they view others. 16  We caution
though, that to the extent that reconciliation is taking place, it is unclear if the
reconciliation is short-term and necessitous or longer-term and sustainable. This is
another question that requires further research.
We believe the Rwandan experience suggests an interesting question: do
government policies that expand commercial interaction among former enemies,
and that spread the benefits of trade to many, prompt commercial cooperation and
perhaps even reconciliation? This suggestion runs counter to some literature on
liberalization and conflict, which suggests that economic liberalization often
contributes to conflict. 
17
13. Interviews were conducted in the local language, Kinyarwanda, at 10 coffee washing stations
in the southern part of the country. Interviews were conducted by a team of students from the National
University of Rwanda in Butare. Five of the ten survey sites were coffee cooperatives; the remaining
five were privately owned coffee washing stations. In the case of interviewees at cooperatives they
included both employees and farmers (in some cases a farmer might also be an employee). Similarly, at
the privately owned coffee washing stations (i.e., non-cooperatives) interviewees were a mix of
employees of the stations and smallholder farmers selling their beans to the station. The methodology
and survey procedure is described in Jutta Tobias, Intergroup Contact Caused by Institutional Change:
An Exploration of the Link Between Deregulation and in Rwanda's Coffee Sector and Attitudes
Towards Reconciliation (2008) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Washington State University) (on file
with author), 25-31. [hereinafter Intergroup Contact]. Surveys on-file with author [hereinafter Coffee
Survey].
14. See Coffee Survey, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CRAMER, VIOLENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WAR, MEMORY,
PROGRESS (Indiana University Press, 2006); ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR'S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER
CIVIL CONFLICT 45, 71, 161 (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Andy Storey, Economics and Ethnic
Conflict: Structural Adjustment in Rwanda, 17 (1) DEV. POL'Y REV. 43, 43-44 (1999); David Keen,
Liberalization & Conflict, 26 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 73 (2005); Han Dorussen, Heterogeneous Trade
Interests & Conflict: What You Trade Matters, 50 (1) J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 87, 89-92 (2006); Dennis
Galvin, Market Liberalization as a Catalyst for Ethnic Conflict in Senegal & Central Java, Indonesia
13-18 (paper presented at the 97"h meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2001).
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The Rwandan reforms may be distinctive in that they have the potential to
benefit all farmers, Hutus as well as Tutsis. And, as a vast majority of Rwandans
are still engaged in agricultural production, this liberalization creates opportunities
for a broad swathe of people to increase their income.' 8 Such policies provide for
commercial cooperation and may create a climate in which informal reconciliation
takes place. If so, then in post-conflict environments, similar broad-based
liberalization policies may present an important complement to more formal
reconciliation efforts such as international tribunals and local court proceedings.
19
II. COFFEE AND POWER IN RWANDA
The history of the coffee industry in Rwanda, until recently, is that of
unfortunate politicization.2 ° Successive governments used control of the coffee
trade for their political and financial gain. Through compulsory production, export
taxes, and a government-controlled export agency, successive regimes captured the
profits of coffee farmers and used these funds to maintain power. 1 So long as
international coffee prices remained high, the system was stable; however, once
prices dropped in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a key government source of
revenue shrank.22 By the early 1990s, the government lost its ability to pay
farmers a subsidized price for coffee, putting at risk its base of rural support.2 3
Missionaries may have first introduced coffee into Rwanda in the early part of
the twentieth century, but official government involvement began in the 1930s
with the Belgian colonial government's "coffee campaigns. 24  Under these
policies, government authorities built nurseries and supplied seeds, but they also
required Rwandan farmers to plant coffee trees. 25  The colonial government
introduced a mandated minimum price for coffee, created mandatory quality
guidelines, and issued special licenses that allowed only some firms to purchase
18. See The World Bank, Rwanda - Country Brief, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTE
RNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/RWANDAEXTN/0,,menuPK:368714-pagePK: 141132-piPK: 141
107-theSitePK:368651,00.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2008) (noting that "[a]griculture currently accounts
for just fewer than 40 percent of GDP and provides jobs to 90 percent of the population. Most
Rwandans rely on subsistence agriculture with limited participation in the market economy"); see also
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2004/2005 382 (2004).
19. See infra Part IIl.
20. Philip Verwimp, The Political Economy of Coffee, Dictatorship, & Genocide, 19(2) EUR. J.
POL. ECON. 161, 161 (2003); see generally Lode Berlage et al., Dictatorship in a Single Export Crop
Economy, (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.hicn.org/papers/dicta.pdf. See Learthen Dorsey, The
Rwandan Colonial Economy: 1916-41, (1983) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Michigan State
University) (on file with author).
21. For a discussion of a variety of African experiences with export agencies, see ROBERT H.
BATES, MARKETS & STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA: THE POLITICAL BASIS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES,
11-29 (University of California Press, 1981); see also TAKAMASA AKIYAMA ET AL., COMMODITY
MARKET REFORMS: LESSONS OF Two DECADES 84-85 (The World Bank, 2001).
22. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 171-75.
23. Id. at 175; see also Andy Storey, Structural Adjustment, State Power & Genocide: The World
Bank and Rwanda, 28 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 365, 371, 375 (2001) [hereinafter Storey, Structural
Adjustment].
24. Dorsey, supra note 19, at 169.
25. Id. at 166-68.
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coffee. 2 6 They imposed export taxes on coffee sales and individual income taxes
on the local producers, most of whom were Hutu farmers. Tutsi chiefs collected
these taxes, which supported the colonial government and their Tutsi allies.27
The post-independence Kayibanda government (1962-1973) maintained a
tight grip on the coffee sector.28 Under this regime, a government agency (OCIR),
together with a monopsony export company (Rwandex), purchased and then sold
on world markets all coffee grown in Rwanda.29 The farm gate price paid to coffee
farmers was set by the government (by OCIR-Caf6 after it was created in 1978). 3o
Middlemen bought beans from farmers and sold them to a monopsony exporter,
Rwandex. The markets where smallholders brought their beans for purchase acted
as "the economic arm of the Gitarama (i.e. Kayibanda) regime."
31
Heavy government involvement in the coffee sector continued under the
Habyarimana regime (1973-1994).32 During the 1970s and 1980s, as world coffee
prices increased, coffee exports provided between 60 and 80 percent of Rwanda's
export revenue.33 Habyarimana ensured control of these important rents by
appointing relatives and supporters to positions of authority at the powerful and
lucrative state-run coffee agency, OCIR-Caf. 34
26. Id. at 181.
27. Id. at 55-56.
28. David Norman Smith, Globalization and Genocide: Inequality and Mass Death in Rwanda, in
ON THE EDGE OF SCARCITY 149, 158 (Michael N. Dobkoski et al. eds., 2002).
29. Interview by World Investment News with Mr. Anastase Nzirasanaho, Director, Office des
Cafes du Rwanda, available at http://www.winne.com/rwanda/tol3interview.html (last visited Sept. 4,
2008) (noting that before 1978 the Offices des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda (OCIR) was
responsible for both the coffee and tea sectors. In 1978, OCIR-Caf6 was created to 'promote the sector
on local and international markets.' Before the liberalization of the sector in the 1990s, OCIR-Caf6
managed approximately 30 percent of the country's export volume. The remainder of the exports
flowed through RWANDEX, S.A., a company partially government-owned and created in 1964.).
30. Paul DeLucco, Raising the Bar: Producing Quality Coffee in Rwanda, in ADCIIVOCA
WORLD REPORT 13, 14 (Spring 2006), available at http://www.acdivoca.org/852571DC00681414/
Lookup/WRSpring06-Page 13-14-RaisingtheBar/$file/WRSpringO6-Pagel 3-14-RaisingtheBar.pdf.
31. Verwimp supra note 20, at 163 (stating that monopsony export agencies were common in
Africa before the 1990s. Typically, they bought low and sold high: purchasing commodities at a
mandatory price which was lower than the world market price, but selling at higher, market rates. The
agency kept the difference and, in this way, imposed a tax on producers, most of whom were poor.); see
also P.T. BAUER, DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT: STUDIES & DEBATES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
387-388 (Harvard University Press, 1972).
32. See Berlage et al., supra note 20, at 22 (noting the policy was contained in a 1978 coffee
cultivation law that made the neglect of coffee trees "punishable" and that created commune-level
coffee monitors who both advised and controlled smallholder farmers. While there was, the authors
note, little pressure to enforce these laws in the early 1980s - because coffee prices were high and
farmers were content to grow coffee- pressures to enforce would have changed in the mid-1980s as
worldwide coffee prices began to tumble.).
33. Berlage et al., supra note 20, at 14. See also David Tardiff-Douglin et al., Find the Balance
Between Agricultural & Trade Policy, Rwanda Coffee Policy in Flux 1 (MSU International
Development Working Papers, No. 59, 1996).
34. Berlage et. al, supra note 20, at 14.
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A rise in coffee prices allowed the government to modestly increase the price
it paid to farmers, although the government continued to retain much of the
difference between the gate price paid to smallholders and the world market price.
Verwimp states: "The very high world market coffee prices allowed the
[Habyarimana] regime's elite to increase both its personal consumption and its
power over the population., 35 The government used its additional revenue to buy
loyalty in rural areas (through higher prices paid for coffee and through subsidized
agricultural inputs) and to spend more on monitoring the population.
36
A crisis began when worldwide coffee prices tumbled in the late 1980s and
the government rapidly lost revenue. 37  For a few years it attempted to keep
payments for coffee stable, but this was an unsustainable policy-especially as,
from 1990 onwards, the government needed resources to fight the invading
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces. By the early 1990s, the government
lowered the price it paid to smallholders; price supports to coffee farmers ended in
1992. 38 Storey writes: "[fjor the great mass of ordinary people, the benefits
accruing from the fact that they were ruled by Hutu rather than Tutsi were wearing
thin, with the result that a rupture between rulers and ruled was deepening. 39
With their income falling, farmers wanted to shift into production of another
cash crop, bananas, but this was forbidden by law (the government may have
refused to modify the law because of coffee's role as the major source of export
revenue and a lack of readily available, viable substitutes).40  With an extensive
system of local monitors in place, it was difficult for farmers to ignore the law.4
However, in the face of falling income and hunger, farmers uprooted as many as
300,000 coffee trees42 and planted food and other more attractive cash crops.
43
The fall in coffee prices, coupled with growing military expenditures in
response to the 1990 RPF invasion, meant that Habyarimana faced a political and
35. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 172.
36. Id. at 171-73. Under the Habyarimana regime, the powerful OCIR-Caf6 agency was run by
relatives of the dictator's wife, members of the clan de Madame also know as the "akazu." Id.
37. Id. at 173-75. See also Berlage et. al., supra note 20, at 22-24.
38. See Storey, supra note 17, at 47.
39. Storey, Structural Adjustment, supra note 23, at 369.
40. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 173-74.
41. Id. at 162. Peter Uvin writes of the reach of the post-colonial Rwandan state: "the Rwandese
state has been able to expand its presence to the most remote corners of the territory and of social life.
Representatives of the state and of the single party were present at even the lowest level of social
organization: each "colline" (hill-the basic geographical reference in Rwanda), each extended family
was in permanence surrounded by centrally-appointed administrators, teachers, agricultural monitors,
internal security agents or police agents, as well as by local party cadres of all kinds." Peter Uvin,
Prejudice, Crisis and Genocide in Rwanda, 40 (2) AFR. STUD. REV. 91, 97 (1997). In a similar vein,
Hintjens writes: "[p]ost-independence Rwanda inherited a legacy of close public scrutiny of all spheres
of life, continuing the former colonial and monarchical state's ability to control each individual through
a network of controls, extending from the apex of the regime to its base at household level." Helen M.
Hintjens, Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 37(2) J. MOD. AFR. STUD., 241, at 245 (1999).
42. Storey, Structural Adjustment, supra note 23, at 369.
43. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 173-74.
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fiscal crisis.44 One option to deal with the fiscal crisis was to find other sources of
revenue. To this end, the government confiscated property and raised taxes to
supplement the budget and there was some reduction of consumption by elites.45
At the same time, foreign aid became an increasingly important part of the
46budget. Prunier argues that in the 1980s, Rwanda's elite relied on three sources
of "enrichment:" coffee and tea exports, tin exports for a brief time, and foreign
aid.47 As the commodity revenues shrank, "there was an increase in competition
for access to that very specialized resource (foreign aid), which could only be
appropriated through direct control of the government at high levels."
48
However, the reliance upon, and competition for, foreign aid created serious
problems within the elite akazu group: 49 "the various gentlemen's agreements
which had existed between the competing political clans since the end of the
Kayibanda regime started to fracture as the resources shrank and internal power
struggles intensified." o With its growing dependence on foreign aid, and in a bid
to remain in power, the government agreed to an International Monetary Fund
(IMF) structural adjustment program in 1990 that led to further hardships for
farmers.5 i
Verwimp argues that in the early 1990s the regime was no longer able to raise
the revenue it needed to buy rural support.5 2 Faced with rural discontent,
Habyarimana used repression and violence as alternatives to the purchase of rural
44. Patrick Cannon, Elusive Quest? The Political Economy of Reconciliation in Post Genocide
Rwanda, Address at the Sacramento State Center for African Peace & Conflict Resolution 141h Annual
Africa/Diaspora Conference (2005), http://www.csus.edu/org/capcr/documents/archives/2005/Confe
renceProceedings/Cannon- I .pdf.
45. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 174-76.
46. Storey, Structural Adjustment, supra note 23, at 371-72.
47. GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 84 (Columbia University
Press 1995).
48. Id.
49. "Akazu" can be translated as "'small house" and in the Habyarimana regime it referred to a
group of senior-level military and civilian advisors who were connected to Agathe Habyarimana, the
President's wife. See Hintjens, supra note 41, at 259.
50. See id.; PRUNIER, supra note 47.
51. PETER UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISE IN RWANDA 57-59
(Kumarian Press 1998). Uvin writes that in 1991 Rwanda entered into a $90 million structural
adjustment program with the World Bank. In 1992 and 1993 additional "loans were negotiated but
only partially implemented." Key policy goals of the program included improving fiscal and monetary
discipline, expanding the private sector and limiting government involvement in this sector, liberalizing
trade, increasing export production and allowing for increased internal migration of workers. These
loans also required a currency devaluation, which sparked inflation. Uvin notes most of these policy
changes were not implemented so aid disbursements for structural readjustment were suspended. Id.
52. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 177-78.
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loyalty.53 Evidence shows rising numbers of arbitrary arrests, massacres of Tutsis,
confiscations of property, and rapes during these years.54
To rebuild its popularity, the regime diverted attention from its own economic
policies to the Tutsi/RPF threat, using this as an excuse for the increased level of
repression within Rwandan society. 55 The government demonized the invaders,
argued that allowing Tutsis into the country would mean Hums would have less of
the extremely scarce resource of land, 56 and used the media to foment ethnic
hatred.57 Mostly, the repression was directed at the Tutsi minority, though some
spilled over to Hutus.5 8 The ultimate results were disastrous. In the three months
between April and June of 1994, approximately 800,000 people5 9 were murdered
and up to 250,000 raped 60 in a country with a population between seven and eight
million,61 roughly the size of Connecticut.62  Three quarters of Rwanda's Tutsi
population 63 and many moderate Hums and Hum opponents of the Habyarimana
government died.64 The Rwandan genocide was stopped not by international
53. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 175, 177. Storey points out that in 1992 Habyarimana did agree to
the creation of a coalition government. With rival Hutus in office, the older guard may have felt their
positions in danger, especially as the economic outlook was dire, so Storey argues they used a variety of
strategies to stave off the possible loss of power: electoral manipulation, use of propaganda blaming the
Tutsi for the economic crisis, violence against opponents, and finally, genocide. Storey, Structural
Adjustment, supra note 23, at 369-70, 375.
54. Berlage et. al., supra note 20, at 23.
55. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 178.
56. For a discussion of land scarcity in pre-genocide Rwanda see Catherine Andr& & Jean-
Philippe Platteau, Land Relations Under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap,
34 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG., 1 (1998).
57. Uvin, supra note 41, at 100.
58. See Storey, supra note 17, at 47.
59. The United Nations reports 800,000 deaths. See, e.g., Letter from Kofi A. Annan, Under-
Sec'y-Gen. for Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. Sec. Council, to President of the U.N. Sec. Council
(Dec. 15, 1999), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdfOpen
Element; Alison Des Forges, who triangulates data from three sources, estimates that at least 500,000
were killed. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 15-16
(Human Rights Watch 1999).
60. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE RWANDAN
GENOCIDE & ITS AFTERMATH (1996), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/l1996/Rwanda.htm#P32
4_67660.
61. Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1243. For a discussion on regional patterns in violence and how it rapidly spread,
see SCOTT STRAUS, THE ORDER OF GENOCIDE: RACE, POWER, AND WAR IN RWANDA 53-64 (Cornell
University Press 2006).
62. Drumbl, supra note 61, at 1250.
63. Alan J. Kuperman, Provoking Genocide: A Revised Histoiy of the Rwandan Patriotic Front,
6(1) J. GENOCIDE RES. 61 (Mar. 2004).
64. See PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 265; see also Drumbl, supra note 61, at 1248 ("Many of the
10,000 to 30,000 Hum who were massacred during the genocide were killed not because they opposed
the genocide per se, but because they were political opponents of the genocidal regime who challenged
the grip of that regime on power without necessarily contesting its anti-Tutsi fanaticism."); Mark A.
Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's Domestic Genocide
Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 579 (1998).
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action, but by the RPF who killed between 25,000 and 60,000 Hutus during the
genocide and in reprisal attacks. 65
Verwimp sums up the Habyarimana regime's descent into genocide as the
result of a failed strategy to maintain political power.66 The government lost the
loyalty of the majority rural population and needed to do something to win back
that loyalty or face expulsion (or worse).6 7 Rural support was shattered by the
government's inability to maintain high coffee prices and by unpopular policies
that forced farmers to grow coffee rather than food or other cash crops.68  In
addition, the economic structural adjustment program imposed real hardships on
most Rwandans: inflation rose, taxes increased, price controls were removed, fees
for health and education were introduced, and price supports for coffee were
eliminated.69 These policy changes imposed substantial costs on Rwandans at a
time when the government was forced to defend itself (and hence, expend scarce
resources) against the invading RPF. 70 To maintain power, the government tried to
legitimize its reign by resorting to ethnic ideology. 71 Frightening farmers with the
specter of Tutsi violence was a means to regain rural support.
72
65. Ariel Meyerstein, Between Law & Culture. Rwanda's Gacaca & Postcolonial Legality, 32 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 467, 472 (2007). RPF soldiers also killed thousands of Hutu civilians after 1994 in
wars in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, the anti-insurgency campaign in northwest Rwanda
in 1997 and 1998 and during the closing of the refugee camps in 1995. Lars Waldorf, Massjusticefor
Massatrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, n. 338 (2006).
Compare DES FORGES, supra note 59, at 705 (describing widespread and systematic human rights
abuses by the RPF before and during the genocide and noting how the RPF massacred groups of
unarmed civilians in public meetings after combat was finished, in places where there had been little or
no slaughter of Tutsi and where militia did not appear to threaten their advance.), with PHILIP
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES:
STORIES FROM RWANDA 219 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1998) ("What most vividly impressed observers
in the waning days of the genocide was the overall restraint of this rebel army, even as its soldiers were
finding their ancestral villages, and their own families, annihilated.").
66. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 161.
67. Id. at 173-74.
68. Id.
69. Storey, supra note 17, at 47-48.
70. Uvin, supra note 41, at 108.
71. Many historians and ethnographers do not consider Hutus and Tutsis to be distinct ethnic
groups. GOUREVITCH, supra note 65, at 47-48 (1998); UVIN, supra note 41, at 92-93. Both groups
speak the same language (Kinyarwanda), belong to the same clans (ubwoko), practice the same
religions, live side-by-side, intermarry and share art, music, and culture. Drumbl, supra note 61, at
1242-44; DES FORGES, supra note 59, at 4; PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 15. In pre-colonial Rwanda, the
terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" referred to farmers and cattle-herders, respectively. Animal husbandry
brought greater status and power, and therefore Tutsis generally enjoyed higher social status and wealth
than Hutus. However, the categories were fluid, and a Hutu could become a Tutsi by acquiring more
cattle. Colonialism, however, changed the significance of the meaning of "Hutu" and "Tutsi." When
Europeans explored Rwanda in the early nineteenth century, they identified Rwandan Tutsis as the
superior race, being generally taller, lighter and in control of Rwanda's pre-colonial monarchy (one of
the most sophisticated in Eastern Africa at the time). Under Belgian colonialism, identity cards
hardened and institutionalized the categories "Hutus" and "Tutsis" and in a system of indirect rule,
privileges reinforced Tutsi's political dominance. The terms no longer referred exclusively to status and
economic activity, but referred to two "races," one of which enjoyed greater political power. DES
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This is certainly not to say that government control of the coffee sector was a
direct cause of the genocide. 73 It is to say that the politicization of the coffee sector
by the Habyarimana regime empowered some elites to use a portion of the coffee
revenue to perpetrate violence. The consequences of extensive government
involvement in this key sector were not simply economic; they were deeply
74political and, ultimately, catastrophic for many.
However, other factors-such as prejudice, strong resentment over land
shortages, a severe refugee problem, resentment over rising prices that resulted
from the IMF-directed economic restructuring, and fear generated by the RPF
incursions-also played important roles in sparking the genocide.75
III. REBUILDING RWANDA
The broad participation in Rwanda's genocide has posed significant
challenges to meting out justice, restoring peace, and rebuilding Rwanda's
76economy. Before the genocide, Hums and Tutsis farmed the same hills,
"attended the same schools and churches, worked in the same offices, and drank in
the same bars. 77  Some intermarried and by one estimate, one quarter of
Rwandans have both Hutu and Tutsi among their eight great-grandparents7 8
Despite sharing so much, violence among Rwandans was widespread.
Killings were public and neighbors often perpetrated the violence with machetes,
sticks, and tools. 79 "Perpetrators" numbered in the hundreds of thousands,8° while
FORGES, supra note 58, at 31-38; STRAUS, supra note 61, at 18-23 (debunking the "ancient tribal
hatred" as an explanation of the genocide); PRUNIER, supra note 47, at 5-23 (describing the colonial
impact on Rwandese society.).
72. Verwimp, supra note 20, at 178.
73. See id. at 180 ("It is not the fall of the coffee price that caused the genocide, but the desire of
the ruling elite to stay in power at all cost.").
74. Id. at 172.
75. Uvin, supra note 41, at 96-105. For an analysis of the participation and spread in violence, see
Straus, supra note 61, at 35-40 (analyzing the hypotheses of nationalism, racial ideology,
dehumanization, deprivation, group conformity, deviant behavior, material incentives, and the security
dilemma hypothesis.).
76. Wole Soyinka, Hearts of Darkness, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, § 7, at 11 (reviewing PHILIP
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR
FAMILIES), ("To capture the uniqueness of the Rwandan crime, one must imagine that nearly the
entirety of the German population participated in the liquidation of the Jews, or that the Russian masses
responded to Stalin's war against the kulaks, armed themselves with picks and shovels and massacred
the kulaks in village after village, instead of merely watching them being herded off to their eventual
extermination.") Under one estimate, "[tihe dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate
of the Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient killing since the atomic bombs of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki." GOUREVITCH, supra note 64, at 4.
77. DES FORGES, supra note 59, at 4.
78. ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, RWANDA: THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE para. 2.4
(2000), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/ 5629/rwanda.html.
79. Id. at para. 16.58.
80. Scott Straus, How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate, 6
J. GENOCIDE RES. 85, 85-95 (2004). Straus defines "perpetrators" as "any person who participated in an
attack against a civilian in order to kill or to inflict a serious injury on that civilian" and estimates
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others facilitated killings or looted. As Mark Drumbl noted, "[m]any Rwandans
provided lists of Tutsi in their region to their killers. Teachers identified students,
physicians identified patients, and pastors identified the faithful.... Many of these
individuals stood silent as murder plagued their streets, but then promptly moved
into a suddenly vacant home." 81
After the genocide, the RPF government began controversial mass arrests and
detentions, often relying on accusations by opportunistic neighbors.82 Many of the
detainees had incomplete case files without specified charges or investigations.
83
By October 1994, approximately 58,000 people were detained in a facilities
designed for 12,000.84 Within three years, this number doubled to 125,000.85
With Rwanda's judicial infrastructure in ruins, these dententions posed a
significant due process challenge. 6 Over 80% of Rwanda's legal personnel had
been killed or fled the country.87 Many courts had been damaged or looted.88 Of
the personnel that remained, few had formal legal training.
89
approximately 200,000. A low-end estimate would be tens of thousands perpetrators. BRUCE D. JONES
PEACEMAKING IN RWANDA: THE DYNAMICS OF FAILURE 41 (2001). A high-end estimate would be
hundreds of thousands. DES FORGES, supra note 59, at 2; MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS
BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 7 (2002); CHRISTIAN P.
SCHERRER, GENOCIDE AND CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA: CONFLICT, ROOTS, MASS VIOLENCE, &
REGIONAL WAR 126 (2001) (estimating that "every fourth person in Rwanda's Hutu population
including men, women, and children - was probably directly involved in the genocide, and millions
rendered themselves indirectly responsible.").
81. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2007).
82. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 41-42. See also DES FORGES, supra note 59, at 754 ("Because the
overburdened judicial system has failed to discover and punish false accusations increasing numbers of
people have brought false charges for their own interests. In some cases ... persons have been obliged
to pay others in order to avoid being false accused and imprisoned or they have been asked to provide a
substantial sum of money to officials in order to arrange for the release of a family member.");
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note 77, at § 18.39. ("In too many cases, false accusations
were made against those whose only 'crime' was inhabiting land or property or working in a post that
returning Tutsi refugees coveted. In other instances, accusers were known to be seeking retribution for
some current or past wrong, real or imagined, but unconnected to the genocide.").
83. U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: RWANDA 2001§
l(d) (2002) (reporting that, in 2001, ninety-five percent of approximately 112,000 individuals
incarcerated were awaiting trial on genocide-related charges, the majority of whom had incomplete
files). Many pre-trial detentions were retroactively legalized. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW &
REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM IN RWANDA 13 (2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/rwandaOO8/.HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW & REALITY, supra note
82, at 14.
84. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW & REALITY, supra note 83, at 14.
85. GOUREVITCH, supra note 65, at 242. See also infra note 110 for more discussion of prison
conditions.
86. Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004 J.
DIsP. RESOL. 355, 371 (2005).
87. Id. at 371-72. Estimates vary as to the number of legal personnel in Rwanda after the
Genocide. National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, Gacaca Overview, http://www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/En/Generaties.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2008) (reporting 758 judges and 70 prosecutors
before the genocide and 244 judges and 12 prosecutors after); UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE,
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The government periodically began granting provisional releases of genocide
suspects in 1994-first the elderly, sick, young, those accused without case files,
and later those who had served their sentences in pretrial detention or had
confessed. 90 By 2006, the number of genocide suspects in pre-trial detention
shrank to roughly 66,000.91 While some releases benefited the wrongly accused,
they have predictably also heightened tensions within Rwanda. As Drumbl notes:
"in the aftermath of the genocide both victim and aggressors must live unavoidably
side-by-side... and share common public spaces.92
To heal wounds, the RPF-led government has adopted a variety of strategies.
The government has participated in international court proceedings, created and
strengthened national and local-level dispute resolution institutions while also
pursuing a program of economic liberalization that seems to provide an alternate
channel for informal reconciliation.93 By most accounts, these institutional and
policy changes in Rwanda have varying records in terms of promoting
reconciliation and providing justice to aggrieved parties and to defendants. We
discuss some of these formal efforts below.
A. Creating the ICTR
With the reluctant support of Rwanda,94 the United Nations Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute
crimes of genocide and violations of international humanitarian law.95 Despite its
RWANDA: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES & GENOCIDE (Special Report No. 13, 1995), available
at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwandal.html (reporting that 40 out of 800 judges and
lawyers were alive and in the country after July 1994).
88. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW & REALITY supra note 83, at 12. Damage to the ministry
building was so severe that the Minister of Justice had to work from his hotel room and file documents
in boxes under his bed. Id.
89. William A. Schabas, Genocide Trials & Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 879, 883
(2005) ("There were only about 20 lawyers with genuine legal education in the country when I visited
Rwanda in November 1994.").
90. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 42-43.
91. U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: RWANDA 2006 §
1 (c) (2007).
92. Drumbl, supra note 60, at 1238.
93. See supra Parts III.A-B, IV.
94. The U.S. government sent Assistant Secretary John Shattuck to solicit the necessary request
from Rwanda for the Tribunal. Before Rwanda consented, Paul Kagame-who at the time served as
Vice-President and Minister of Defense-expressed concerns that crimes of genocide would not be
punished with the death penalty; the international court would be removed from Kigali and therefore
justice would not be palpable to Rwandans; and Rwanda would not have jurisdiction over criminals
who fled outside Rwanda. David P. Rawson, Prosecuting Genocide: Founding the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 OHIO N.U.L. REv 641, 648-49 (2007) (citation omitted). Consequently, these
reservations hardened into opposition, particularly when it was clear that Tribunal would not sentence
genocide leaders to death, and Rwanda ultimately voted against the Resolution establishing the
Tribunal. Id. at 654-55.
95. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, Annex, art.
1-4, 7 U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR statute] (giving the ICTR substantive
jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. Temporal jurisdiction was between January 1,
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location in Arusha, Tanzania, the ICTR has concurrent jurisdiction with Rwandan
national courts, though it theoretically has primacy and can ask national courts to
defer to it in any case.9 6 The ICTR was modeled after the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and-for the sake of economy and consistency in
law-it shares institutional links;97 its rules of evidence and procedure mimic the
ICTY's with some modification,9 and it consists of three trial chambers, a registry,
a head prosecutor, 99 and an appeal chamber similar to the ICTY. °0 0
There were several motivations behind creating the ICTR. Because the
Rwandan court system was in shambles after the genocide,10' there were concerns
that vengeance would compromise fair trials and due process.1"2 The ICTR,
empanelled with judges selected by the General Assembly,' 0 3 would presumably
be in a better position to mete out justice impartially. Some also believed that an
international tribunal would expedite extradition and deter genocide in other
countries. 
104
As of April 2007, the Tribunal has handed down twenty-seven judgments
upon individuals holding leadership positions during the genocide, including the
1994 and 31 December 31, 1994 to allow prosecution of genocide planners.).
96. See id. at art. 8; S.C. Res. 977, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (Feb. 22, 1995). For a further
discussion of the difficult relationship between the Tribunal and Rwanda, see Eric Husketh, Pole Pole:
Hastening Justice at the UNICTR, 3 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs 8, 11, 50-65 (describing how after
ICTR's decision to release Barayagwiza-considered one of the top criminals in Rwanda-the
Rwandan government suspended cooperation with the Tribunal, preventing the travel of witnesses to
Arusha and refusing to issue the Chief Prosecutor a visa to enter the country, although her office and
investigating staff were in Kigali.). See also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: TIME FOR PRAGMATISM (2003), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?I=I&id=2303 [hereinafter TIME FOR PRAGMATISM]
(describing how the Rwandan government prevented the travel of witnesses because it objected to the
prosecutor's inquiries into war crimes presumed to have been committed by the RPA in 1994).
97. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security
Council Resolution 955, 9, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995).
98. ICTR statute, supra note 95, at art. 14.
99. In 2003, the Security Council split the prosecutorial duties for the criminal tribunals for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
100. ICTR statute, supra note 95, at arts. 10, 11, 13, 15, 16.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
102. According to Human Rights Watch, "[m]ore than one hundred persons were condemned to
death for genocide [and] [m]any international leaders and organizations opposed the executions,
both on general principle and because some of the trials had failed to meet international standards of
due process. In several, the accused had no access to counsel and presented no witnesses in their
defense. In the case of former prosecutor Silas Munyagishari, political considerations may have
influenced the verdict. The executions were carried out in several towns before large and often festive
crowds." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, Rwanda: Human Rights Developments,
available at http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/africa/rwanda.html; see also David Wippman,
Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 483 (1999)
(discussing the possible perception of national trials as illegitimate and "a case of 'victor's justice."').
103. ICTR statute, supra note 95, at art. 12.
104. The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 1 October 1994from the Secretary-General Addressed to
the President of the Security Council, 138, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125
(Oct. 4, 1994).
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former Prime Minister, six Ministers, one Prefect, and seven Bourgmestres. 105  It
has convicted the first head of government for committing genocide and, since the
Nuremberg Trials, the first media leaders for inciting genocide. 10 6  By some
accounts, it also advanced the definitions of "ethnicity" and "rape" for the
purposes of proving genocide. 10 7 By the end of 2008, eighty-six accused persons
will have been brought before the ICTR.'0 8
Scholars have suggested that the Tribunal creates other indirect benefits. It
has been argued that internationalizing the justice process has motivated countries
to apprehend extremist Hutu leaders, which has thereby thwarted military
reorganization of a defunct Interahamwe (the Hutu paramilitary force that was
responsible for much of the genocide violence) that continued to launch attacks
against the RPF until 1999.109 Some have also suggested that the ICTR has made
the Tutsi government more cautious about violent reprisals against Hutus, as the
Tutsi government benefits from distinguishing itself morally from the previous
leadership and maintaining international legitimacy. 10
The ICTR's accomplishments, however, have not been without costs or
criticism."1 In its early years, the Tribunal was mired in charges of financial
105. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Tribunal at a Glance, paras. 1, 8,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
106. Id. at paras. 5, 8. See also Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR
99-52-T, Sentence, paras. 1095-1101 (Dec. 3, 2003).
107. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Achievements of the Tribunal,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-
T, Decision by Appeals Chamber (June 1, 2001) (affirming prior judgment of ICTR Trial Chamber, as
well as convicting defendants for complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v.
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence (May 15, 2003) (advancing the definition of
"conspiracy") Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T (May 16, 2003); see also Payam
Akhavan, Focusing on ICTR Case Law- The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence, 3.4, J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 989 (2005) (discussing how the Trial Chambers went to great lengths to characterize Tutsis
as an 'ethnic' group in order to justify the label of genocide).
108. ICTR Newsletter (Int'l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda), June 2008, at 1, available at
http://69.94.11.53:80/ENGLISH/newsletter/june08/juneO8.pdf.
109. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 23 (2001).
110. Id. at 24 (noting also the "occasional punishment of crimes perpetrated by government forces
against Hutu civilians"). See also Rwanda: Human Rights Developments, supra note 102 ("An
increasingly active military justice system [has] tried soldiers for indiscipline and common crimes,
sentencing several to prison and even to death after conviction for charges such as theft and murder.").
But see Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49, 61
(Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (noting that "[tirials of genocide suspects - and a
pointed avoidance of substantial legal cases against RPA soldiers have sought to shape public
perception to recognize the moral failings of many Hutu leaders while raising the moral standing of the
current national leadership."). See also supra note 65 for more information on RPF war crimes.
11. For a general criticism of international criminal trials see Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in
Domestic and International Law, 55 DUKE L. J. 75, 147 (2005) ("If only the strongest states have the
power to establish international tribunals, determine their memberships, set their agendas, and thus
influence the development of international criminal law, predictably the resulting norms of international
criminal law will reflect the interests of the strong states, not the weak ones.").
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corruption and mismanagement.' 12 For example, some genocide suspects were on
the payroll as defense-team investigators."' The proceedings continue to be
criticized as slow and expensive, 1 4 and some argue that the ICTR diverts resources
away from rebuilding a rule of law in Rwanda." 5 For 2008 and 2009, the ICTR
will have a budget of $247,466,600116 to complete six trials and commence two.
117
Despite the ICTR's mandate to complete all trials by the end of 2008 and all work
by 2010,118 twenty-nine detainees are currently on trial while seven await trial. 1 9
Already, the ICTR has applied for a one-year extension.
120
112. In 1997 the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services reported that in the
Tribunal's Registry not a single administrative area functioned effectively ("Finance had no accounting
system and could not produce allotment reports, so that neither the Registry nor United Nations
Headquarters had budget expenditure information; lines of authority were not clearly defined; internal
controls were weak in all sections; personnel in key positions did not have the required qualifications..
. ."). The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office ofInternal
Oversight Services, Annex, 9, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/789 (Feb. 6, 1997).
The report also noted that the "Chief of Finance did not have the required degree in administration,
finance or accounting nor... [the] relevant United Nations experience in those fields." Id. at 20.
113. Victor Peskin, Rwandan Ghosts, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2002, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2002/feature-peskin-sepoct2002.msp.
114. See Yacob Haile-Mariam, The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV.
667, 736 (1999) (asserting that the Rwandan courts began prosecuting defendants a year after the ICTR
and closed four hundred cases by the middle of July 1998, whereas the ICTR had not completed one
trial by the middle of August 1998). But see Husketh, supra note 96, at 6 (pointing to the increased
efficiency of the ICTR as the rate of completion nearly doubled between the first and second mandate
and attributing the delays to a lack of technical and translation services, infrastructure, security of
lawyers, transportation costs between the two offices, perverse financial incentives for defense lawyers,
failure to utilize plea bargaining, and fee-splitting).
115. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L.
365, 466 (1999) ("[E]ach dollar spent by the international community on the ICTR is one less dollar
available for assistance to Rwandan courts..."). Compare Akhavan, supra note 109, at 25-26 (arguing
against Alvarez by pointing to violence against judicial personnel, emotionally charged prosecutions
and politicization of the Rwandan judiciary), and Des Forges & Longman, supra note 110, at 62
("Given [Rwanda's] politicization of the judiciary, it is not at all clear that investing more in the
Rwandan justice system would have promoted the rule of law and encouraged reconciliation in the
country.").
116. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, General Information,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
117. According to the most recent completion strategy report, "[flour cases concerning seven
accused are in judgement [sic] drafting phase and two-single accused cases are completed, with the
closing arguments yet to be heard. There are six trials involving 19 accused currently ongoing. Two
single-accused trials are scheduled to commence shortly. There are four new cases which are to be
prepared for trial and four single-accused cases for which request for referral to Rwanda are pending."
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Report on the Completion Strategy of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 4, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2008/322 (May 13, 2008).
118. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 99.
119. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Detainees-Status on 10 October 2008,
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
120. ICTR Newsletter, supra note 108, at 2.
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It is also uncertain how much the ICTR has healed wounds amongst
Rwandans. Despite ICTR's outreach program (established in 2000), 121 many
Rwandans are unaware of the Tribunal's far-removed work in Tanzania. 122 Of the
Rwandans are aware, many are skeptical. High-ranking suspects at the ICTR
enjoy better defense lawyers and judges than low-ranking suspects who are tried in
Rwanda, often without representation, 23 before judges with minimal experience. 124
They also receive a higher quality of health care than victims and at maximum can
be sentenced to life imprisonment (sometimes in a Scandinavian jail). 125  Until
recently, 126 lesser offenders in Rwanda could receive death sentences if convicted
and otherwise face harsh, over-crowded prison conditions.1 27 These differences in
treatment between Rwandan courts and the ICTR have led to accusations of class
justice, 128 and many Rwandans believe that the ICTR places too much emphasis on
responding to the rights of the accused and not enough to victims and survivors,
129
including those who serve as witnesses.1 30  Hutus have other reasons to be
121. The Outreach Program primary locale is the Information Centre Umusanzu mu Bwiyunge in
Kigali. The Centre provides briefings, lectures, workshops and films about the Tribunal's work. The
Tribunal also established an internship program in 2000 to allow Rwandan law students to work at the
court each year and began translating court documents into Kinyarwanda. International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 106. See also Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda-The Promises and
Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme, 3.4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 950 (describing the Programme as
ineffective). According to Alison Des Forges and Timothy Longman, the outreach centre is
"[alttractive to a tiny part of the urban elite ... [but] offers little to the majority of Rwandans, who are
illiterate and live in rural areas." Des Forges & Longman, supra note 110, at 56.
122. A survey conducted in 2002 of 2,091 Rwandans found that 87% either were "not well
informed" or "not informed at all" about the Tribunal. Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein,
Conclusion: A Common Objective, A Universe of Alternatives, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE
AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 323, 334 (Eric Stover & Harvey Weinstein
eds., 2004).
123. See infra note 139.
124. Haile-Mariam, supra note 114, at 736.
125. See id.
126. Organic Law No. 31/2007, July 25, 2007,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,LEGISLATION,,RWA,46badalc2,0.html, art. 4-5; see also U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Rwanda, 136, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/2000/41 (Feb. 25, 2000) (prepared by Michel Moussalli)
(finding that of the some 2,406 persons tried by the special genocide courts, 14.4% were sentenced to
death, 30.3% to life imprisonment, 34% to jail terms of between 20 years and one year, and 19%
acquitted).
127. Rwanda: Gacaca: A Question of Justice, AMNESTY INT'L, Dec. 17, 2002, at 8, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR47/007/2002 ("Preventable diseases, malnutrition and the
debilitating effects of overcrowding resulted in a reported 11,000 deaths between the end of 1994 and
end of 2001."); see also Yassin Yusingwire, Harsh Prison Conditions Propagating HIV/Aids - Study
Reveals, RWANDA NEWS AGENCY, July, 2 2008, available at
http://www.rnanews.com/index.phpoption=com content&task=view&id-39&Itemid=31.
128. Haile-Mariam, supra note 114, at 736.
129. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice. External Perceptions of
the International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 26:2 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 21, 29 (2002).
130. Stephen Buckley, Witnesses of Genocide Targeted; Protection Efforts Fail Rwandans Waiting
to Testify in Tribunals, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1997, at A24 (reporting that assailants opened fire on
a shop owner and eleven others; also reporting assaults on U.N. officials by Hutu former-exiles);
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skeptical of the ICTR. For Hutus who did not perpetrate violence, but suffered
violations of international humanitarian law in attacks by the RPF, the ICTR's
exclusive focus on prosecuting Hutus has left them without a remedy.13 1 Zorbas
argues that: [i]t is nearly impossible to overstate the bitter disappointment and ill
will the ICTR's alleged rampant corruption, bureaucracy, incompetence, and above
all its meager results.., has generated with the RPF government, the Rwandan
people and internationally."
'1 32
B. Rebuilding National Courts
Rwanda's courts reopened in 1996 understaffed, with 324 magistrates, 100
deputy prosecutors and 298 judicial police officers. 133 To try genocide crimes,
134
the government established specialized chambers in civil and military courts and
carved out four categories of culpability for acts related to the genocide: Category
1 for planners, notorious murderers, and rapists; Category 2 for perpetrators,
conspirators, and accomplices of homicide; Category 3 for persons accused of
serious but non-lethal assaults; and Category 4 for perpetrators of property
offenses. I35  Penalties initially ranged from death and life imprisonment for
Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda and UN Court Vow to End Witness Deadlock, ARUSHA TIMES, Feb.
5-11, 2005 (reporting the murder of a confessed genocide killer upon return from the ICTR); Husketh,
supra note 96, at 58 ("In December 1996, a witness was killed with his daughter, brother, nephew and
seven others. The witness had asked investigators for protection, but the nearest telephone was more
than 20 miles away. The next month, January of 1997, another witness and her entire family of eight
were killed after returning from testifying in Arusha.").
131. See The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed, INT'L CRISIS GROUP,
June 1, 2001, at iii; see Husketh, supra note 96, at 2 (suggesting that the Security Council's decision to
not renew Prosecutor Cara del Ponte's mandate was partially motivated by the Rwandan's government
animus against her as well as its desire to preempt her continued investigation into war crimes by the
RPF/RPA); TIME FOR PRAGMATISM, supra note 75 (describing pressure from the Rwandan government
to not prosecute members of the Rwandan patriotic army (RPA)). Letter from Sidiki Kaba, President,
International Federation of Human Rights & Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch
to Council Members (June 2, 2006), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/02/rwandal3504.htm (urging the Security Council to assure the
Prosecutor will be afforded the necessary time to prosecute RPA cases even if those proceedings
continue beyond 2008).
132. Eugenia Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, I AFR. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 29, 34
(2004); see also De Forges & Longman, supra note 110, at 56-57 (noting that "although the majority of
the population is not hostile to the ICTR, people tend to see it as an activity of the international
community conducted primarily for its own benefit, with little relevant to the process of reconciliation
in Rwanda.").
133. See Gacaca: A Question of Justice, supra note 127, at 12.
134. Rwanda had no provision for prosecuting and punishing genocide crimes in its domestic penal
code, though it had ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the Geneva Conventions and other conventions of international humanitarian law in 1975.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 14-16 (discussing and criticizing how Rwanda
established the legal basis for prosecution).
135. Organic Law No. 08/96, Aug. 30, 1996, art. 2,
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm [hereinafter 1996 Genocide Law]; see also
Zorbas, supra note 130, at 35.
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Category 1 offenders to civil damages for Category 4 offenders, though sentences
could be reduced through plea-bargaining.
136
By December 2003, the twelve national specialized courts had tried 9,700
accused.137  These trials have been criticized for a number of shortcomings,
including, but not limited to: a lack of due process,
138 unqualified judges, 139
inadequate defense representation,
140 executive influence,' 4 1 "Tutsification,"'
' 42
impunity for RPF war crimes, 143 and creating a sense of collective guilt against
Hutus. 144 To victims, the court proceedings were often inaccessible and provided
little reparation. 145 To the accused, Tutsi-dominated juries led some to view
136. 1996 Genocide Law, supra note 135, at art. 14-15.
137. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 44.
138. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, RWANDA: COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2007
(Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrptI2007/100499.htm (reporting that
judiciary is subject to executive influence and does not always ensure due process or expeditious trials).
139. Gacaca: A Question of Justice, supra note 127, at 12 (observing that "[flew of the magistrates
were jurists and less than a quarter had adequate legal training").
140. 1996 Genocide Law, supra note 135, at art. 36 (stating that the Rwandan government is not
obliged to pay for defense counsel); THE DANISH INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL AID IN RWANDA: A
REPORT ON THE LEGAL ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE IN RWANDA annex at 83 (2004) (estimating that only
half of the defendants have benefitted from representation).
141. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PROSECUTING GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
REPORT ON THE ICTR AND NATIONAL TRIALS (Jul. 1997), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/rwanda.htm (finding that Hutu prosecutors and
judges who did not arrest or convict suspects because a lack of evidence were sometimes charged with
genocide or corruption); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS (1999),
available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-08.htm (in 1999, the Supreme Court disbanded); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003: RWANDA: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS (2003), available
at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa9.html (finding that in 2002 six Supreme Court judges were forced
to resign after the Prosecutor General threatened to jail them on corruption charges).
142. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 102 (concluding that the "judiciary [was] largely in the
hands of Tutsi, many of whom were recent returnees."); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, supra note
78, at § 18.38 ("as in virtually all other sectors of Rwandan public life, the justice system was dominated
by Tutsi").
143. When the ICTR prosecutors attempted to investigate crimes by RPA soldiers, Rwandan
officials forced the suspension of the trials by not allowing the witnesses to travel. When other
countries, such as France and Spain, have issued arrest warrants for RPA soldiers and officers, Rwanda
has broken diplomatic relations and ignored the warrants. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 4
("only 32 soldiers have been brought to trial for crimes committed against civilians in 1994, with 14
found guilty and punished with light sentences"); Waldorf, supra note 65, at n. 338 (citation omitted)
(Lieutenant Colonel Fred Ibingira, for example, who commanded the troops that massacred an
estimated 2000-4000 Hutu refugees at the Kibeho refugee camp in April 1995 was sentenced to
eighteen months in prison for "failing to give assistance to a person in danger."); see also Des Forges &
Longman, supra note 110, at 61 (noting that the courts have been used extensively to intimidate
potential critics and opponents of the regime).
144. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 40 ("Early on, the RPF seemed more interested in using the judicial
system to impose collective guilt and social control on the Hutu majority than in establishing
individualized accountability for the genocide.").
145. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86, at n. 375 ("although compensation for victims has been
awarded in 50 percent of civil verdicts, in none of these cases were the verdicts awarded against the
state or against those found criminally guilty") (citation omitted).
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themselves as prisoners of war on the losing side, rather than as defendants in a
criminal trial. 146  Given the enormous caseload and the judiciary's limited
resources, it would have taken over eighty years to try all of the accused. 147
The Rwandan government undertook two dramatic initiatives to improve the
delivery of justice. First, it sought to reform the judiciary 148 by introducing greater
autonomy, 149 raising the educational criteria for judicial posts, 150 and increasing the
pace of justice.15 1 Second, it launched gacaca, a form of popular justice modeled
on past customary conflict-resolution practices, to judge most genocide cases.
152
Although gacaca and the conventional courts differ in law, procedure, and
personnel, the two now constitute a single judicial system. 1 53
C. Institutionalizing Gacaca
"Gacaca" translates to "lawn" or "small grass," the setting of traditional,
informal gatherings where community1 54 elders resolved minor conflicts over
146. Drumbl, supra note 61, at 1290; Des Forges & Longman, supra note 110, at 62-63 ("domestic
trials have been politicized and many Rwandans view them as one-sided .... "); Straus, supra note 80,
at 151 (finding that many interviewed perpetrators equated killing Tutsis with fighting the enemy and
that the most powerful predictor of why one perpetrator committed more violence than the other was
whether a respondent described himself as motivated by war-related fear or anger).
147. Schabas supra note 89, at 888; ORG. OF AFR. UNITY, supra note 78, at § 18.37 (estimating
between two to four centuries to try all those in detention).
148. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 23 (stating that a commission consisting of
members of the supreme court, prosecutor's office, bar association, ministry of justice, and law faculty
drafted 13 laws, which were mostly introduced in 2004 to reform the judiciary).
149. See generally Organic Law No. 07/2004, Jan. 1, 2004,
http://www.amategeko.net/display-rubrique.php?ActDo=all&lnformation-ID=2&Parent-ID=9&type=
public&LangueID=An&rublD=30692036#30692036, [hereinafter 2004 Organisation of Courts Law]
(determining the Organisation, Functioning, & Jurisdiction of Courts). The president of the Supreme
Court now has hiring and removal powers with the approval of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, a
group consisting of judged elected by peers, the President of the National Commission of Human
Rights, two representatives of law faculties, and the ombudsman. Id. at art. 6. The office of the public
prosecutor was guaranteed financial and administrative autonomy from the Ministry of Justice. Organic
Law No. 03/2004, Mar. 20, 2004, art. 2, http://www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/prosecutionservice.pdf. To
discourage corruption, judges' salaries increased between two and five-fold. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 83, at 26.
150. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 27 (finding that before the reforms, approximately
10% held law degrees and some lower court judges had only finished primary school. In 2004, a law
was passed requiring law degrees and six years of experience for High Court judges and eight years for
Supreme Court judges).
151. To streamline the judicial system, the government cut the number of courts and judges. See
generally 2004 Organisation of Courts Law, supra note 149, at title I. Judges are also now required to
deliver an official judgment, including reasons for the decision, within 30 days of the closure of trial
proceedings. Id. at art. 168.
152. Between 2005 and 2008, the conventional courts tried only 222 genocide cases. As of 2008,
all remaining cases will be sent to gacaca with the exception of national or provincial leaders and those
accused sent back to Rwanda from other national or international jurisdictions. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 83, at 17.
153. Id. at2.
154. Rwandan communities traditionally were separate homesteads spread out on hillsides rather
than villages. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UPROOTING THE RURAL POOR IN RWANDA § III (2001),
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property, inheritance, personal injury, and marital relations. 155  Historically,
gacaca's goal was to restore tranquility to the community. 156  All community
members participated and, apart from women, anyone could voice their opinion. 57
Both parties were expected to accept the sentences imposed, and after the conflict
was resolved, to maintain a social relationship. 158  In addition to collectively
meting out punishments, communities performed welcoming rites for persons who
had completed their punishments to recreate a sense of belonging.' 59
Throughout the colonial period, gacaca continued to play a role in resolving
local disputes even as parts of the legal system formalized. Colonial courts often
accepted gacaca judgments, and in some cases, the courts reviewed rather than re-
litigated appeals.16 By the 1980s, local authorities (or sector officials) used
gacaca as a "semi-official" institution to adjudicate disputes outside state courts. 61
Though gacaca ceased in most communities during the genocide, some
reorganized it afterwards to arrest genocide suspects and deal with property
disputes arising from returnees. 162 In 1998, some detainees, encouraged by prison
officials, began their own gacaca to hear confessions of inmates.
163
In 2001, the Rwandan government passed legislation to revive and adapt
gacaca to try all genocide-related cases, except Category 1 cases which would be
heard by national courts.1 64 Local communities elected over 250,000 judges1 65 and
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/rwanda/. See also Zorbas, supra note 132, at 36-7.
155. For more serious crimes such as murder and cattle theft, the king's representatives or chiefs
generally had jurisdiction. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 48.
156. Christopher J. Le Mon, Rwanda's Troubled Gacaca Courts, 14 (2) HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 16
(2007).
157. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 48.
158. Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda's Restorative Dispute Resolution Response to
the 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L. J. 1, 30 (2005). In recent times, the losing party had to
provide beer to the community as a form of reconciliation. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 49.
159. Paul E. Nantulya, The Gacaca System in Rwanda, 4 CONFLICT TRENDS, at 53-54 (2001),
available at http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2001_4.pdf.
160. Id.
161. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 49.
162. Jennifer Widner, Courts & Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist's
Perspective on the African Case, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 65-66 (2001) (noting how the voluntary
character of resettlement after the genocide-with families and friends banding together to form new
villages-meant that members of these new communities trusted each other enough to make election an
acceptable means of selecting gacaca members, and the number of gacaca rapidly increased).
163. PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL, GACACA JURISDICTIONS AND ITS PREPARATIONS 29 (2002),
available at http://www.penalreform.org/resources/rep-gal-2002-preparations-en.pdf (noting that in
Kigali Central Prison, the gacaca committee heard 1127 confessions from approximately 8000 inmates
from late 1998 to late 2001).
164. Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001, art. 2. After the accusation phase ended,
approximately 818,000 persons had been accused, 77,000 of which were in category I. In March 2007,
the government redefined the categories to move some accused from category I to 2. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 83, at 21-22.
165. Judges are not required to have legal qualifications. Rwandans of "integrity" who are at least
twenty-one years of age can be elected as Gacaca judges so long as they have not participated in the
genocide; are free from the spirit of "sectarianism"; have not been sentenced to a penalty of at least six
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after an 18-month pilot phase in approximately 10% of the cells in Rwanda,'66
gacaca was launched with some modification nationwide in January 2005.167
The modernized gacaca system departs from traditional gacaca in
fundamental ways."' First, gacaca judges are not community elders, but elected,
relatively young citizens, including women."' Second, gacaca courts judge
serious crimes, such as homicide, whereas traditional gacaca resolved only minor
civil disputes. 170 Third, modem gacaca is an official state institution that applies
codified, rather than "customary" law, with powers to summon persons, issue
warrants, conduct searches, confiscate property, and impose sentences up to 30
years in prison.17 1 In traditional gacaca, family and clan members, rather than
individuals, paid assessed judgments, as all members were "parties to the
conflict."' 172  Finally, modem gacaca's goals are a mix of retributive and
restorative justice,17 3 rather than a restoration of communal tranquility. 7 4
months of imprisonment; are of high morals and conduct, truthful and honest; and are characterized by
a spirit of speech sharing. Jacques Fierens, Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 896, 914 (2005); Organic Law No. 16/2004, June 19, 2004, art. 14 (hereinafter Gacaca
Law] (establishing the organization, competence and functioning of gacaca courts charged with
prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other crimes against humanity,
committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994).
166. 762 gacaca courts were established. Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 474. In the first nine
months of trials, 2000 defendants pled guilty and almost 6000 were convicted. But more than 10,000
fled Rwanda fearing "false accusations and unfair trials." Le Mon, supra note 156, at 17.
167. In June 2004, the government amended the law to combine Categories 2 and 3 into a single
category, slightly modified the definitions of crimes, reduced the number of courts and judges, lowered
the quorum from fifteen to seven, reduced some penalties to encourage more guilty pleas, capped the
maximum sentence to thirty years (instead of life), and provided for mitigating circumstances. Waldorf,
supra note 65, at 53-54; Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at arts. 18, 23, 51, 55, 56, 81.
168. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 52. For a description of the Gacaca's proceedings and their
differences from American trials see Linda E. Carter, Justice and Reconciliation on Trial: Gacaca
Proceedings in Rwanda, 14 NEw ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. 41,45-47 (2007).
169. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 52 (citing NAT'L SERVICE OF GACACA COURTS, REPORT ON
IMPROVING THE LIVING CONDITIONS FOR THE INYANGAMUGAYO 2 (2005)) (finding on the basis of
surveys that thirty-four percent of gacaca judges are women)). We attended a gacaca proceeding in
Butare on May 28, 2008. The panel ofjudges hearing cases that day was composed of two women (one
older, one younger) and four men. The lead judge was an older man.
170. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 52.
171. Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 475-76. The Gacaca jurisdictions can impose sentences as
severe as thirty years of imprisonment for Category 2 defendants who have killed or attempted to kill
their victims and refuse to confess, whereas Category 3 defendants can only be ordered to pay civil
compensation for damages to victims' property. Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at arts. 73-75.
172. Leah Werchick, Prospects for Justice in Rwanda's Citizen Tribunals, 8 (3) HUM. RTS. BRIEF
15, 17 (2001); Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86, at 376; Waldorf, supra note 65, at 48.
173. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 14 ("Under retributive justice, offenders are punished generally
with incarceration. Under restorative justice, offenders offer atonement and victims forgive though a
process of face-to-face mediation. Apologies, community service, and other forms of restitution replace
incarceration."); see also John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic & Pessimistic
Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1999) (providing a general overview of restorative and retributive
justice). For a criticism of how restorative justice can sacrifice due process, reinforce pre-existing
power relations, fail to deter, and short-change victims, see Richard Delgado, Prosecuting Violence: A
Colloquy on Race, Community, & Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2000).
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Gacaca begins at the cell level
175 where every Rwandan is legally obligated
176
to participate as a member of the general assembly, in a public enterprise of
evidence gathering. 177 Initially, Rwandans accused alleged perpetrators in front of
the general assembly. 178  But due to lackluster participation, in 2004, the
government mandated local administrative officials and nyumbakumi (persons in
charge of ten households) to gather information from small groups and
individuals. 79 The information gathered during this accusation process (which the
accused cannot contest180 ), coupled with prisoner confessions and state prosecutor
files, constitute the basis for categorization by the court-nine adults of "integrity"
elected by the general assembly.1 8' The court then tries suspects accused of lower-
level crimes and passes the more serious Category 2 offenders up to secteur (or
"sector") level tribunals and Category 1 offenders to the Public Prosecution
Office.
82
To encourage confessions, persons who plead guilty to Category 2 or 3 crimes
are eligible to serve only half of their sentences, half of which would be in
community service.'8 3  Although the court can reject a confession deemed
incomplete or insincere,' 84 anecdotal evidence suggests that the benefit of
expedited trials, provisional release, and reduced sentences has encouraged false,
insincere, and formulaic confessions.1
8 5
174. The official goals of the gacaca are: (1) to reveal the truth about what has happened, (2) to
accelerate the genocide trials, (3) to eradicate the culture of impunity, (4) to reconcile the Rwandans
and reinforce their unity, and (5) to prove that Rwandan society has the capacity to settle its own
problems through a system of justice based on Rwandan custom. National Service of Gacaca
Jurisdictions, The Objectives of the Gacaca Courts, http://www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnObjectives.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
175. Gacaca has three courts: a cell gacaca court, a sector gacaca court, and a sector's gacaca court
of appeals. Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at arts. 33-38.
176. Persons who refuse to testify can be prosecuted by Gacaca courts and sentenced to up to one
year imprisonment. Id. at art. 29.
177. Gacaca hearings are public, except for rape related proceedings and other exceptional cases in
which hearings are conducted in camera. Id. at arts. 21, 38.
178. Id. at art. 32.
179. Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 488.
180. The nyumbakumi present the accusations to the assembly to confirm the accuracy of the
information recorded, not to test its truth. Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at arts. 33, 35-37. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 21 for a discussion of how the nyumbakumi had disproportionate
power to influence the nature and amount of information that would form the basis of judicial files of
accused persons and how the method undermined the intended openness of the process; in some cases,
when Category 1 suspects were brought to trial in conventional courts, judges used information
gathered in gacaca to justify its conviction without independently assessing the information's validity.
181. Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at arts. 33-34.
182. Id. at art. 34.
183. Id. at art. 73.
184. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 73 ("Gacaca courts do not have to accept confessions, even if the
prosecutor has certified them as truthful.").
185. Id. at 72-74; see also Madeline H. Morris, The Trials o]'Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of
Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 361 (1997).
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Gacaca has been criticized by some and celebrated by others. Some have
praised it as an innovation in transitional justice that combines traditional, local
institutions with modem judicial practices leading to transformative, democratic
effects. I1 6  Others, however, criticize gacaca for failing to meet international
human-rights standards with respect to due process,187 impartial and qualified
judges, lss a right to appeal,' 89 a right to defense, 190 and separating prosecutorial and
judicial roles. 191 Some also criticize gacaca for failing to advance justice or
reconciliation, and instead delivering participatory popular punishment and
collectivizing guilt against Hutus.' 92 Acknowledging its shortcomings, however,
186. Le Mon, supra note 156, at 16. See Rosa E. Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms
& the Rule of Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2336 (2003) ("[G]acaca. . may hold out Rwanda's best
hope of coming to terms with the genocide in a way that rebuilds confidence in the government and the
rule of law."). See also Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in
Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355, 376-77 (discussing how gacaca may help to promote
democracy and the rule of law and that the sheer number of tribunals should protect the process as a
while from undue influence by the central government). See also Christine M. Venter, Eliminating
Fear Through Recreating Community in Rwanda: The Role of Gacaca Courts, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 577, 581 (2007) (arguing that if gacaca courts were properly funded and organized it could
provide a link between the past of the genocide and the participatory democracy Rwanda hopes to be).
See Aneta Wierzynska, Consolidating Democracy Through Transitional Justice: Rwanda's Gacaca
Courts, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1934, 1958 (2004) (stating that gacaca creates "a critical communication
bridge between the people and the State that did not exist before."). But see Waldorf, supra note 65, at
77 (noting that these arguments assume incorrectly that the RPF-dominated government is moving
toward greater democracy and that gacaca is truly participatory).
187. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 2. See also Daly, supra note 186, at 383.
188. See Gacaca: A Question of Justice, supra note 127 at 38. See also Meyerstein, supra note 65,
at 479 (discussion of how the training of gacaca judges is inadequate).
189. See Gacaca Law, supra note 165, arts. 89-92. See also Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86 at
389. But see Daly, supra note 186 at 383 (noting that the appellate process may undue some benefits of
gacaca because they take time, do not strengthen the community and depend on the commitment of the
authorities to the rule of law).
190. See Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at art. 32 (noting Gacaca law does not entitle defendants to
be represented by a lawyer, but allows the defendant to speak for himself, and for individuals at the
hearings to speak for or against the defendant). See also Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86, at 388-89
(noting defendant's position may be further compromised because most cases will be judged on the
basis of the files prepared and handed over to the Gacaca judges by the public prosecutor's offices,
making it difficult for lay judges and defendants to challenge the information). See also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 20-21.
191. See Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at art. 33 (nothing that individuals responsible for gathering
evidence and categorizing cases may also called as witnesses). See also Meyerstein, supra note 65, at
488-90 (discussing how local authorities and nyumbakumi abused their positions to protect themselves
and their families during the information gathering and accusation stage and ultimately played the role
of gacaca judges, who were relegated to recording and confirming the accuracy of the transcriptions
without confirming its validity). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 43-45.
192. The Gacaca Courts Prepare to Finish Their Mandate, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 24,
2007, http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/402/135/ (reporting as of 2007, 818,564 cases
accusing crimes of genocide had been prepared, including 77,269 in the first category of politicians and
planners, 432,557 in the 2nd category of executors and 308,738 cases of looting. 71,405 cases had been
heard, verdicts had been rendered in 64,800 and remain for 6,605. There had been intended acquittals
for 15,219 while 7,200 verdicts had been appealed.). See also Waldorf, supra note 65, at 80-81
(arguing that gacaca will likely criminalize a vast swathe of the Hums population, given that naming
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others conclude that it was the best alternative for delivering justice in post-
genocide Rwanda.
193
Given the range of criticism directed towards Gacaca, it is unclear the extent
to which it has healed wounds. Rather, the process may have inflamed animosities
amongst Hutus and Tutsis. According to Lars Waldorf, "Hutu[s] generally view
[gacaca] as a way to release family members wrongly imprisoned, while Tutsi
survivors often see it as a disguised amnesty for those who killed their family
members." 194  Initially, the majority of Rwandans supported gacaca. 195  Yet,
despite mandated attendance at gacaca court, 196 participation has declined
significantly, suggesting a shift in attitudes.1 97
accomplices provides sentence reductions; opportunistic looters are technically genocidaires;
accomplice liability is broadly defined; accomplices are treated as perpetrators; there is no provision for
defenses and justifications, even though there might be colorable claims of duress; and bystanders will
be prosecuted for failing to render assistance). See also Daly, supra note 186, at 385 (noting that
gacaca has only a limited ability to promote reconciliation since its rebuilds communities under a cloud
of punishment and retribution). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THERE WILL BE No TRIAL: POLICE
KILLINGS OF DETAINEES AND THE IMPOSITION OF COLLECTIVE GUILT 27-30 (2007), available at
http:/Ihrw.org/reports/2007/rwandaO7O7/ (observing that since the end of 2006, officials have been
imposing collective punishments on residents, including fines, obligatory labor, and beatings when
survivors suffer property damage.). But see Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 491 (arguing that the abuses
of power by local officials actually serve to protect the Hutu population and thus work against a
collectivized guilt against the Hutu majority).
193. See Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 467 (arguing that Amnesty International's legalist approach
to the gacaca prevents it from appreciating its unique postcolonial hybrid form that is perhaps uniquely
capable of responding to the genocide). See also Carter, supra note 168, at 49-50 (acknowledging that
gacaca is an ingenious solution since it spreads out the work among a large number of people with the
possibility of justice on a large scale); Widner, supra note 162, at 66 (arguing that gacaca is integral to
reconstructing the rule of law because an ineffective, overused judicial system risks undermining
judicial legitimacy and leads people to turn away from law altogether).
194. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 74 (citation omitted). See also Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86,
at n.249 (citing Jeremy Sarkin, The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics,
Human Rights. Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide, 45 J.
AFR. L. 143, 288-89 (2001), quoting Alison Des Forges who suggests that that "the fairness of the
proceedings will vary enormously ... (and) the result in any one community will be determined by the
local balance of power.") (citation omitted in original).
195. TIMOTHY LONGMAN ET AL., Connecting Justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward
Accountability and Reconciliation in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, 222 (Eric Stover &
Harvey Weinstein, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2004) (stating gacaca was the most popular
alternative. In 2002, when polled on how much contribution the judicial alternatives would make in
advancing reconciliation, 33.8% believed the ICTR would make a significant or very significant
contribution, whereas 69.2% thought the genocide trials would, and 84.2% believed that gacaca
would.). See also PETER UVIN, THE INTRODUCTION OF MODERNIZED GACACA FOR JUDGING SUSPECTS
OF PARTICIPATION IN THE GENOCIDE AND MASSACRES OF 1994 IN RWANDA 8, available at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/humansecurity/pdf/Boutmans.pdf (citing over 70% support for gacaca). But see
Waldorf, supra note 65, at n.366 (suggesting that attitudinal surveys may have measured respondents'
ability to parrot widespread government propaganda, rather than actual support for gacaca).
196. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 66, n.370 & n.378 (noting that in the pilot phase, absenteeism was a
problem in eight out of the twelve jurisdictions, partially because of the harsh economic realities.
Ninety percent of the Rwandan labor force are subsistence farmers. Many are already required to
participate in government sensitization campaigns and community labor typically (umuganda) five
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Some attribute this decline in supportto the public perception that gacaca
court judges are corrupt. Judges serve without pay and lack legal qualifications,
1 98
which make them susceptible to corruption. Some defendants have successfully
bribed judges, 99 for example, to avoid, for example, a Category I classification,2 0
and tens of thousands of judges have been accused of participating in the
genocide. 2 1  Judgments also aren't always enforced against indigent
genocidaires.2 °2 Without a guarantee of compensation, Tutsi survivors are
reluctant to participate as witnesses, particularly when they fear retaliation and
violence by their Hutu neighbors20 3 and by genocidaires who have confessed but
have been provisionally released. 04
Hutus too have little incentive to participate in gacaca when they have no
opportunity to discuss the suffering inflicted on them by the RPF, or when they
fear accusation.0 5 False denunciations, though punishable by law, are a simple
times a month.). See also 2004 Gacaca Law, supra note 165, at art. 29 (noting that the Rwandan
government now mandates participation, penalizes absenteeism with 3 to 6 months in prison and for
repeated absentees, 6 months to 1 year). But see Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 86, at 392, for a
criticism of the state-mandated use of Gacaca to deal with genocide cases may undermine its original
value as an informal, spontaneous dispute resolution mechanism.
197. AVOCATS SAN FRONTIERES, MONITORING OF THE GACACA COURTS JUDGMENT PHASE,
ANALYTICAL REP. 10, 25 (Mar.-Sept. 2005) (reporting that "although the local population may have
been present in large numbers, they were reluctant to become involved" and hypothesizing the mains
reasons to be fear of reprisals, refusal to denounce friends and families, and fear of being convicted for
false testimony). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RGHTS ISSUES IN RWANDA
1 (Jan. 2006), available at http://hrw.org/wr2k6/pdf/rwanda.pdf (noting that many Rwandans did not
trust gacaca courts and boycotted sessions).
198. See Waldorf, supra note 65, at 67.
199. See Le Mon, supra note 156, at 17. See generally Seven Gacaca Judges of a Same Court
Arrested, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 7, 2007),
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/1325/461/.
200. See Le Mon, supra note 156, at 17 (referencing articles that reported bribery ofjudges).
201. Id. at 18 (citing report by Rwandan government office in charge of gacaca courts indicating
that authorities suspect 45,396 gacaca court judges of having committed crimes during the genocide).
See also Waldorf, supra note 65, at 67, n.386 (estimating 1319 judges had been replaced as of January
2004, with 656 having been accused of genocide. In the Murama Sector, the gacaca president stated
that the removal of all judges who had pillaged in 1994 would leave gacaca without any judges.)
(citations omitted).
202. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 57 & n.317 (noting that "in a sample of 192 judgments from 1997
to 1999, civil parties obtained the right to compensation only half the time). Compensation through
community service could exacerbate ethnic tensions if seen as a return to the colonial-era forced labor
system where Hutu clients worked for Tutsi patrons. Id.
203. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2007) (reporting
between 11 and 25 genocide witnesses were killed in 2007, while another 22 reportedly committed
suicide). See also Le Mon, supra note 156, at 17-18, nn.10, 13, & 14 (citing reports of multiple cases of
retaliation against witnesses).
204. Arthur Asiimwe, 36,000 Genocide Suspects Freed from Rwandan Jails, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), July 30, 2005 (reporting that a genocide survivor told a journalist, "It will now be useless to
attend these gacaca courts. These [released detainees] will stick together and hide the truth."). See
Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 487-91, for a discussion of how prisoner releases has contributed to the
atmosphere of anxiety and distrust.
205. See Le Mon, supra note 156, at 18-19. See also Timothy Longman & Theoneste Rutagengwa,
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route to get rid of a neighbor whose property one covets or to resolve a property
dispute that the gacaca courts do not hear.20 6 Indeed, when the national phase
began, ten thousand Hums fled to Burundi, °7 causing an international refugee
crisis. Many feared they would be accused as perpetrators or bystanders, killed in
revenge after being named, or, in the case of provisional releases, be sent back to
208prison. Some Hum extremists and families of prisoners propagated rumors that
gacaca was a harbinger of a counter-genocide, designed to round up Hums and kill
them en masse.20 9 The tactics adopted at the local level to coerce participation (i.e.
fines and public admonishments) have reinforced these fears and help perpetuate a
culture of secrecy, 210 where silence is perceived as loyalty to kin and patrons rather
than as deception.21'
The Rwandan government has further frustrated gacaca's potential to
advance reconciliation by criminalizing certain challenges to gacaca courts. At
times, the government has accused citizens and international organizations 212 who
Memory, Identity and Community in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, 176 (Eric Stover &
Harvey Weinstein, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2004) (finding in attitudinal surveys that "[m]any
Hutu resent the fact that their experience of suffering is excluded from official discourse.").
206. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 72, n.420 (noting that Gacaca courts do not hear property disputes
stemming from the ethnic violence before the genocide, the RPF's displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Hutu in northern Rwanda during the civil war of 1990 to 1993, the return of several
hundred thousand Tutsi exiles who had fled before 1994, some of their families having left Rwandan in
1959, and the return of about two million Hutu refugees who had fled after the RPF victory in 1994).
See also ORG. OF AFR. UNITY, supra note 78, at §17.9 (reporting that according to the OAU, the return
migration totaled 750,000 just four months after the genocide. "In a literal sense, it was almost an
entire new Tutsi population that emerged after the war," many of whom had no connection to villages
or communities in Rwanda.).
207. Meyerstein, supra note 65, at 490.
208. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS 2005, HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (Mar. 8, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rlsihrrpt/2005/61 587.htm (reporting that in late April 2005, more than 6500
Hutu fled Rwanda). See also Mary Kimani, 600 Tried, Thousands Flee, INT'L JUST. TRIB. (May 22,
2005) (quoting one fleeing Hutu, "We fled because of one-sided justice. It is one community judging
the other.").
209. See Waldorf, supra note 65, at 67-68.
210. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 65, at 22 ("Rwandan culture is a culture of fear..."). See also
DANIELLE DE LAME, A HILL AMONG A THOUSAND: TRANSFORMATIONS AND RUPTURES IN RURAL
RWANDA 14-15 (University of Wisconsin Press, 2005) ("Secrets are a preferred tool for forging an
identity, both individual and collective . . Shared secrets develop internal solidarity rooted in trust in
each other's ability not to reveal them ... Secrecy persisted as a cultural habit well beyond pre-colonial
and colonial Rwanda, where people, subjected to a climate of constant insecurity, were at the mercy of
capricious chiefs whose intrigues affected their lives The habit of secrecy continues in the most
ordinary circumstances: one's dwelling place is mentioned evasively, and the rooms of a house are set
up so as to conceal the state of one's provisions.").
211. Waldorf, supra note 65, at 70.
212. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 39, n.104 ("Among the international organizations
accused of supporting divisionist and genocidal ideas by one or both of the parliamentary commissions
were CARE International, Trocaire, Norwegian People's Aid, 11-Il-Il, Kolping Family, Pax Christi,
Voice of America (VOA), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Human Rights Watch as well as
the Catholic Church, the Association of Pentecostal Churches in Rwanda, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh
Day Adventists, the International United Methodist Church, and the Mennonites.").
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have spoken out against or not participated in gacaca as harboring "divisionism
''213
or "genocidal ideology, '214 which is punishable by a maximum of five years in
prison."' In one case, a local government official accused citizens of having
"genocide and ethnic ideologies" for boycotting a gacaca, though the boycott was
based on allegations that judges were soliciting bribes.
21 6
The Kagame government's increasingly authoritarian tendencies have not
passed unnoticed by international watchdog organizations. Amnesty International
reports that Rwandan journalists continue to face violence, intimidation, and
harassment."' Human Rights Watch has condemned the recent killings of
genocide survivors and extrajudicial executions, calling for "prompt, effective, and
impartial investigations and prosecutions in all situations, including in the killing
of genocide survivors. 2 18  Such killings clearly raise tensions between ethnic
groups in the country. In the past two years, Human Rights Watch has also
denounced illegal detentions, police killings, and the disappearance of prominent
29business people within the country. 19 In its 2008 Country Report on Human
Rights in Rwanda, the U.S. State Department says:
213. Id. at 35. "In 2002 'divisionism' (then called 'sectarianism') was made a crime .... Id. The
crime of sectarianism occurs when the author makes use of any speech, written statement or action that
causes conflict that causes an uprising that may degenerate into strife among people. Id. "When asked
to define 'divisionism,' not one judge interviewed by Human Rights Watch researchers was able to do
so, despite having convicted defendants on divisionism charges." Id. (internal citations omitted).
214. Id. ("Under the 2003 law punishing genocide, persons condemned for denying or grossly
minimizing genocide, attempting to justify genocide or destroy evidence related to it were liable to a
minimum of ten years and a maximum of twenty years in prison.") (internal citations omitted); see also
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, pmbl, arts. 9, 13, 33 (June 4, 2003) (stating that that
revisionism, negationism, the minimization of genocide and all ethnic, regionalist, and racial
propaganda based on an form of division is punishable by law); see also Human Rights Watch,
Preparing for Elections: Tightening Control in the Name of Unity, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
BACKGROUNDER, May 8, 2003, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503bck.htm (noting
that in 2003, the government accused forty-six MDR politicians and their alleged supporters of
divisionist ideology.); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 40-41 (offering further
discussion of problematic prosecutions that have led to marginalization of political opposition, chilled
dissent against government policies such as land reform, social isolation of individuals charged and
approximately 1,300 prosecutions in 2007-2008 alone).
215. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 38.
216. Le Mon, supra note 156, at 19; Kamembe Residents Boycott Gacaca, THE NEW TIMES
(KIGALI), (Sept. 29, 2006); see also Genocide Survivor Boycotts Gacaca, Cites Harassment, THE NEW
TIMES (KIGALI), Nov. 16, 2006.
217. See AMNESTY INT'L REPORT 2008: STATE OF THE WORLD'S HUMAN RIGHTS, RWANDA
(2008), http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/africa/rwanda.
218. Human Rights Watch, Killings in Eastern Rwanda, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BACKGROUNDER,
(JAN. 2007), http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0 I 07/rwanda0 I 07web.pdf.
219. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2007, RWANDA - EVENTS
OF 2006 (2007), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,,RWA,45aca2a5b,0.html ("Police and
members of Local Defense Forces illegally detained and abused hundreds of persons, many of them
street children and members of other vulnerable groups in Kigali, the capital, during the first months of
2006.").
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Significant human rights abuses occurred, although there were
important improvements in some areas. Citizens' right to change their
government was restricted, and extrajudicial killings by security forces
increased. There were reports of torture and abuse of suspects, although
significantly fewer than in previous years. Police sometimes imposed
collective punishments, including beatings, on residents of communities
in which the property of genocide survivors had been damaged or
destroyed.... Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons....
There continued to be limits on freedom of speech and association, and
restrictions on the press increased.220
Filip Reyntjens goes so far as to say that "[t]en years after the 1994 genocide,
Rwanda is experiencing not democracy and reconciliation but dictatorship and
exclusion., 221 Reyntjens discusses the conflicts and disagreements that have
wracked the RPF over the past decade. These include allegations of abuse of
power, human rights violations, discrimination, and intimidation of opponents and
critics. 2 22 He concludes that the RPF is continuing the authoritarian tendencies of
the Habyarimana regime and warns that the international community should not be
blinded by the competent, technocratic rule of the RPF. 3  Reyntjens sees
ominous" signs that the situation in Rwanda might further deteriorate and that the
seeds for "massive new violence in the medium to long run" may already be
sown. 2 24 An echo of this concern is found in the U.S. Millennium Challenge
Corporations' 2007 country scorecard for Rwanda which gives the country low
marks in the category of "Ruling Justly.
225
Given the scope of the 1994 genocide, and the enormous number of people
involved as perpetrators or accomplices, it is unsurprising that both the ICTR and
the national legal system have experienced real difficulties in effectively and
efficiently prosecuting cases. Empowering local communities to draw on their
local knowledge and resolve genocide-related disputes relieves stress on the formal
legal system and may speed justice for some. Gacaca holds the potential to
promote inter-ethnic reconciliation, but it is unclear if the process is living up to
this potential.
Strategies for promoting reconciliation do not rely solely on legal process;
however, in addition to the courts and gacaca, the government has undertaken a
variety of other efforts to promote reconciliation. These include creating the
220. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -RWANDA, (March
11,2008), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100499.htm.
221. Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship, 103 AFR. AFF. 177,
177 (2004).
222. Id. at 180.
223. Id. at 209.
224. Id. at 209-10.
225. Millennium Challenge Corp., Rwanda Candidate Country Scorecard FY08, (2007),
http://www.mcc.gov/documents/score-fy08-rwanda.pdf (demonstrating that although Rwanda scores
well in terms of controlling corruption, it scores poorly in terms of the protection of civil and political
rights and in terms of voice and accountability).
VOL. 37:2
CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, which organizes meetings,
conferences, and workshops to discuss unity and reconciliation; 226 building
genocide memorials and museums; 22 7 and sponsoring remembrance events, such as
the national day of mouring and the annual mourning period in April. 228 In
addition to these programs, informal reconciliation in Rwanda may be encouraged
by the government's policy of economic liberalization. We discuss the
government's effort to liberalize the economy generally and the important coffee
sector particularly below.
IV. LIBERALIZATION IN RWANDA
Over the past decade, the Rwandan government has liberalized much of the
economy, albeit slowly and with some difficulty. There are currently no
restrictions on investments in Rwanda,229 which is also a member of several
regional trade groups, including the East African Community . 0 Tariffs have been
eliminated on goods entering from COMESA countries but they remain a weighted
9.7% in 2005 for other goods from other nations. 23 1  The government has
privatized a large number (70 of 104) of industries.2 32 While Rwanda scores
reasonably well on a recent economic freedom index in terms of fiscal, trade, and
monetary freedom, it scores poorly in terms of property-rights protection and
233corruption. Overall, the trend in Rwanda over the past 10 years is towards
increased economic freedom and in November 2006, Rwanda was designated as a
"Threshold" country by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in the U.S.,
and cited for having "demonstrated an impressive track record on economic
reform. 234
VISION 2020 creates a strategic plan for economic change in Rwanda.2 35
This plan "has served as the platform for sector policy-setting in each ministry
since late 2003. "236 The goals created by VISION 2020 and Rwanda's Poverty
226. Zorbas, supra note 132, at 38. The NURC was created in 1999. It participated in "civic
reeducation" aimed at former Interhamwe members or other demobilized soldiers by providing courses.
Id.
227. Id. at 39.
228. Id. at 40.
229. THE HERITAGE FOUND., 2008 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, RWANDA (2008),
http://www.heritage.org/Index/country.cfm?id=Rwanda.
230. John Gahamanyi, Finanical Institutions: Rwanda Joins EADB Board, THE NEW TIMES
(Kilgali), Nov. 6, 2008, available at http://newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13706&article=10550.
231. THE HERITAGE FOUND., supra note 229.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Press Release, Millennium Challenge Corp., Millennium Challenge Corporation Board of
Directors Announces 2007 Threshold Program Countries Niger; Peru; and Rwanda (Nov. 8, 2006),
available at http://www.mcc.gov/press/releases/2006/release- 1 10806-thresholdcountryselection.php;
see also MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., supra note 225.
235. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA MINISTRY OF FIN. AND ECON. PLANNING, VISION 2020 (July 2000),
available at http://www.moh.gov.rw/docs/VISION2020.doc.
236. Int'l Fund for Agric. Dev., Enabling the Rural Poor to Overcome Poverty in Rwanda,
www.IFAD.org, Nov. 2006, http://www.ifad.org/operations/projects/regions/Pf/factsheets/rwanda-e.pdf
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Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) include improving the institutional environment
to allow for private-sector development and infrastructure improvements; focusing
on good governance (including democratization, national reconciliation, political
stability, and security); improving productivity (especially of land); improving
human capital through investments in health and education, creating a service-
based economy with a focus on ICT (information communications and
technology); 237 reducing external support; relying more on exports; and promoting
regional integration.
238
Progress towards the VISION 2020 goals has been mixed. As a result of
these policy changes, the annual economic growth rate was above 10% between
1994 and 2004; this was the second highest growth rate in Africa during that
period.239 Per capita GDP rose at a rate of 5.3% during this same time period and
this was the third highest growth rate in Africa. 240  The British overseas
development agency, DFID, reports that poverty levels dropped from 70% of the
population in 1994 to under 57% in 2006.241 The government has improved tax
collections. The amount collected by the Rwandan Revenue Authority has
increased three-fold from the equivalent of 60 million pounds in 1998 to the
equivalent of 240 million pounds in 2006.242 The government has also devoted
much time and attention to diversifying the economy. Results have been good
enough that in 2006 the British government and the Rwandan government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding that commits the bilateral partners to continuing
reforms and financial support.243
Despite this progress the per capita GDP is depressingly low at $260.244
Most Rwandans still work in agriculture.24 5 The World Bank reports that only 6%
237. Xan Rice, Poverty-stricken Rwanda puts its faith and future into the wide wired world, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 1, 2006, at 20, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/rwanda/story/0,,1
834621,00.html.
238. RWANDAN AUTHORITIES, AN APPROACH TO THE POVERTY REDUCTION ACTION PLAN FOR
RWANDA: THE INTERIM PRSP 12 Int'l Monetary Fund (2000), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/NP/prsp/2000/rwa/01/110100.pdf.
239. Press Release, Dep't for Int'l Dev., Rwanda's remarkable recovery leads UK to commit funds
for next 10 years, (March 1, 2006), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/pressreleases/rwan
da-commitment.asp.
240. Dep't for Int'l Dev., Organization Record (Jan. 6, 2007),
http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org-35681.html.
241. Dep't for Int'l Dev., A Way to Help Governments Reduce Poverty, WWW.DFID.GOV.UK, Jan.
7, 2008, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/prbs-hovs-reduce-poverty-examples.asp#Rwanda. If these
figures are accurate, then such changes go some way towards addressing two prongs of Collier's
conflict trap: economic growth and low incomes. COLLIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 53. However,
past experience may not be replicated in the future. Id.
242. Dep't for Int'l Dev., Good Taxes Reduce Poverty in Rwanda, WWW.DFID.GOv.UK, Jan. 10,
2008, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/casestudies/files/africa/rwanda-tax.asp.
243. Dep't of Int'l Dev., supra note 239.




of Rwandans have access to clean water and electricity. 246 And, Rwanda scores a
low 150 out of 178 in the World Bank's latest (2008) Doing Business report.
247
V. MODEST GAINS AND ENCOURAGING SIGNS IN THE COFFEE SECTOR
One area where the government's liberalization policies have created benefits
for many poor Rwandans is in the coffee sector. Economic liberalization in this
important sector has benefited thousands of Rwanda's smallholders. 248 Reforms
have freed farmers from mulching requirements and the legal obligation to grow
coffee. Farmers can now interplant coffee with other crops,24 9 freely contract with
buyers, 250 and join together in cooperatives to take advantage of economies of
scale.2 51
Rwandex S.A., the old monopsony purchaser/exporter, was sold to a private
owner in 2007.252 Recent reports suggest the company may face liquidation as a
result of excessive debt. 253 If this were to happen, Rwanda would still have four
246. World Bank Group Dev. Outreach, Poverty Alleviation and Economic Growth in Rwanda
through S&T, http://wwwl .worldbank.org/devoutreach/january07/article.asp?id=397.
247. Doing Business 2008: Comparing Regulations in 178 Economies 6 (World Bank, Working
Paper No. 41938, 2008), available at http://go.worldbank.org/DXNFXDD490.
248. AKIYAMA ET. AL., supra note 21, at 88 (noting that after Uganda liberalized its coffee sector
"Rwandan policy makers became keenly aware of the sound performance of Uganda's subsector
following liberalization and were eager to apply similar policies.").
249. Scott Loveridge, Edson Mpyisi & Michael T. Weber, Farm-Level Perspectives in Rwanda's
Coffee Supply Chain Coordination Challenge, 4 Agricultural Policy Synthesis: Rwanda Food Sec.
Project/MINAGRI, No. 2E (2002), available at http://www.aec.msu.edu/agecon/fs2/rwanda/ps-2e.pdf.
250. DeLucco, supra note 30, at 13.
251. A cooperative is defined as: "a private business organization that is owned and controlled by
the people who use its products, supplies or services." Univ. of Cal., Davis Dep't. of Agric. and Res.
Econ., Rural Coop. Ctr., What is a Co-op?, http://www.cooperatives.ucdavis.edu/whatis/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2008). Agricultural cooperatives form when farmers voluntarily choose to associate in
a larger group to pursue some common goal(s) or benefits. These benefits might include access to
processing equipment, economies of scale, risk spreading, socializing opportunities, microloans, or
improved health or education facilities. Cooperative members may also work at the cooperative as
employees. Cooperatives operate under bylaws that specify roles and responsibilities of members,
management, and the board of directors. Members elect the cooperative's management and board of
directors. In addition, members meet regularly to debate the cooperative's direction. In the field study,
when asked what the benefits of being a coffee cooperative member was, roughly 27% responded
-earning money and improving living conditions," 20% responded "getting loans," 20% responded
"getting inputs" (e.g., fertilizer, pesticide), 15% responded "training and quality improvement" and 15%
responded to "join others and socialize." Jutta M. Tobbias, Data Analysis from Field Study [hereinafter
Field Study 2008] (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
252. African Agriculture, Rwanda Coffee Company Privatized, Value-Addition Estimates
Expected, http://africanagriculture.blogspot.com/2007/03/rwanda-coffee-company-privatized-
value.html.
253. Before the sale of the company, the government of Rwanda owned a 51% share in the
company. Id. On the recent liquidation of Rwandex, see Gertrude Majyambere, Coffee Sector: Why
Rwandex Was shut Down, THE NEW TiMES, (Kigali, Rwanda) May 18, 2008, available at
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue= 13630&article=647&week= 15.
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coffee exporters operating in the country, an increase in competition that may
improve marketing efficiency. 4
Important improvements in this sector have come from bilateral and
multilateral development assistance. NGOs have helped farmers establish
cooperatives and have trained cooperative members in quality control, processing,
and marketing efforts.2 5 Removing a coffee bean from its cherry (depulping) is a
lengthy process, 256 and the government, donors, NGOs, and the private sector have
worked with smallholders to improve the process, in part by helping to build scores
of washing stations257 around the country to improve quality. 258  The result is
254. AKIYAMA ET. AL, supra note 21, at 109 (discussing coffee sector liberalization in India,
Uganda, and Togo write: "the disappearance of inefficient marketing parastatals, and increased
competition (the result of private traders entering the coffee market) marketing efficiency has improved
substantially in Togo and Uganda." Rwanda's liberalized export sector should result in a similar
improvement in marketing efficiency).
255. Samuel Goff, Tex. A&M Univ., International Partnerships for the Development of the
Specialty Coffee Sector in Rwanda, Address Before the AIAEE 2 2nd Annual Conference (May 16,
2006), in International Teamwork in Agriculture and Extension Education, May 2006, at 244, available
at http://www.aiaee.org/2006/Accepted/244.pdf.
256. The coffee season in Rwanda runs from March through July. As coffee cherries ripen, farmers
go to their fields every few days to pick the fruit. The coffee bean is the seed of this fruit. To get the
bean, the fruit must be removed by either a dry or wet process. Dry processing is a low-technology
approach that uses the sun to dry the fruit which is subsequently milled. In a wet process, used at coffee
washing stations in Rwanda, growers bring their cherries to a washing station to be weighed and de-
pulped. The cherries are pre-sorted, by floating them in water to separate the heavier cherries from the
lighter ones. The cherries are run through pulping machines that remove much of the fruit from the
bean. The fruit from the pulping may be retained to use as fertilize, but the beans ferment in holding
tanks, as fermentation makes it easier to remove the remaining mucilage. After the fermentation process
is complete, the beans are washed four to five times. The beans are sorted again and left to float for 24
hours. After this 24-hour period, the beans are laid out on sorting tables, and workers pick out damaged
or irregular beans. The beans are dried in the sun until they reach a desired moisture level, which may
take between ten days to two weeks depending upon the weather. This "'parchment" coffee is then
packed in burlap bags and stored for shipment to a miller who will remove the parchment and produce
green coffee beans. Beans are typically exported after this and roasted by the importer. For more
discussion of this process and supply chain concerns as they relate to coffee production see Raphael
Kaplinksy, Competitions Policy and the Global Coffee and Cocoa Value Chains 8-9 (paper prepared for
United National Conference for Trade and Development 2004), available at http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/library/files/Kaplinsky-Raphael-EN-052005-IDS-Competition-policy-and-the-global-coffee-
and-cocoa-value-chains.pdf
257. Coffee washing stations are generally located in the rural, Rwandan hills where there is little
infrastructure. US AID was instrumental in building the first washing station in Rwanda. By 2005, 46
washing stations had been built, 38 with the financial assistance from US AID. By 2007, the number of
washing stations in operation more than doubled to 120. SPREAD, a US AID Project currently
provides NGO support to 95 washing stations. See infra note 259. Still in 2007, less than 10% of all
Rwandan coffee was sold fully washed, indicating more growth opportunities. OTF Group, Coffee
Strategy Update, Continuing Achievements Made in the High Quality Arabica Coffee Market, 2007-10
(on file with author).
258. Peter Hulm, Rwandan Coffee Goes from Ordinary Coffee to Star(bucks), International Trade
Forum (Jan. 2007), http://www.tradeforum.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1 134 (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
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increasing demand for Rwandan fully washed coffee, some of which is considered
"specialty coffee. 259
One of the major effects of the liberalizing Rwanda's coffee industry is that
smallholders who produce higher valued specialty coffee have higher incomes.
The price that cooperatives and private buyers are paying farmers for unwashed
coffee cherries has risen from 60 to 80 Rwandan francs in 2004 to 120-150 francs
in 2007.26 o Once the cherries are washed they can be sold to buyers for an even
higher price. In 2004, the Maraba cooperative sold washed coffee for $3.26 per
kilo; in 2007, the cooperative was able to charge $4.08 per kilo.261 In 2007, the
COOPAC cooperative was selling its cherries for $4.00 per kilo, 262 and the
Rusenyi cooperative was selling in a range between $4.40 and $5.50 per kilo.263 In
a truly remarkable achievement, in September 2007, importers paid as much as
$55.00 per kilo for the best Rwandan coffee.264 In 2008, the Rwandan government
projects that 25% of the beans sold for export will qualify as high-value, defect-
free specialty coffee.265 Cooperatives use the income these sales generate to pay
farmers for cherries, to pay salaries for washing-station staff, and they may provide
other benefits to members-short-term loans and improvements to local schools
would be just two examples.266
A 2006 report to US AID details that "[a]pproximately 50,000 households
have seen their incomes from coffee production double, and some 2,000 jobs have
259. "Specialty" coffee is defined by the Specialty Coffee Association of America as: "coffee that
has no defects and has a distinctive flavor in the cup." Specialty Coffee Ass'n of America, Coffee Term
Definitions, http://www.scaa.org/pdfs/glossary.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2008). Coffee is ranked into
five classes. Class 1 is "specialty" coffee and may have between 0 and 5 defects. The next class,
"premium grade" has between 6 and 8 defects. Coffeesearch.org, Coffee Trade: New York Coffee
Exchange, http://www.coffeeresearch.org/market/coffeemarket.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
Washing coffee may increase the quality of the coffee, which, in turn, might improve the chances of a
particular lot of coffee being considered "specialty. See Loveridge et al supra note 249, at 3.
260. Richard Swanson & Tom Bagaza, Sustaining Partnerships to enhance Rural Enterprises and
Agribusiness Development (SPREAD Project), SPREAD-Growers First Coffee Cooperative Assessment
& 2008 Cooperative Development Work Plan, 22-24, (report prepared for the Tex. A&M Univ. Sys.
Borlaug Inst. of Int'l Agric. and Growers First, 2008), available at
http://www.spreadproject.org/documents/SPREAD%20Coffee%2Cooperative%2OAssessment%20and
%20Workplan.pdf.
261. Id. at 22.
262. Id. at 24.
263. Id. at 23.
264. At the Golden Cup coffee auction and competition in Kigali, in September of 2007, Rwandan
coffee was bought by U.S. coffee importers for as much as $55 per kilo (approximately $25 per pound),
a Rwandan record price comparable to the world's most expensive coffees. Rwanda Dev. Gateway,
Coffee Sells at Record Prices (Sept. 10, 2007),
http://www.rwandagateway.org/article.php3?id-article=6848.
265. Coffee Revenues Double Before Year End, RWANDA NEWS AGENCY, July 24, 2008, available
at http://allafrica.com/stories/200807240894.html.
266. See infra text accompanying note 393 for further discussion of cooperatives and potential
benefits. In Field Study 2008, 83% of respondents who were members of cooperatives believed that
they could not have received the economic and social benefits without being a member of the
cooperative. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 14.
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been created at coffee washing stations. 267 An NGO involved in the US AID
project reports: "incomes (in the specialty coffee sector) have doubled or tripled,
and business skills, labour conditions and community spirit have been
enhanced." 268 In US AID-supported coffee zones, earnings increased by 50-100%
between 2004 and 2007.269 With more income, farmers can repair their homes,
buy clothes and livestock, pay school fees for their children, and get through the
long months between harvests more easily than before.27°
The results from our exploratory field survey271 conducted in the June 2008
among rural Rwandan coffee farmers confirm that smallholder farmers are
benefiting from changes in the coffee sector. Sixty-four percent of those polled
said that their workload had been reduced in the past five years or, alternatively,
since joining a cooperative. 272 Farmers reported using this extra time to pursue
other income generating activities, helping care for family and friends, and to meet
socially.273  When asked to compare the level of happiness with their economic
situation now versus in the past (i.e. five years ago, or alternatively before they
joined the co-op), only 3% polled said they were very happy before, whereas 40%
said they were very happy now.274  Seventy-two percent reported feeling very
confident that there are now good opportunities to make a better life for themselves
and their families.275 While these results are not dispositive, they further
corroborate the thesis that farmers are experiencing important economic gains that
may, in turn, help promote more positive feelings towards others, a step towards
reconciliation.
267. Chemonics Int'l, Assessing US AID's Investments in Rwanda's Coffee Sector - Best Practices
& Lessons Learned To Consolidate Results & Expand Impact 4 (2006), available at
http://www.minagri.gov.rw/IMG/pdf/USAID-RwandaCoffeeAssessment.pdf.
268. ACDI/VOCA, Specialty Coffee: Increased Quality & Profits for Smallholders, available at
http://www.acdivoca.org/852571 DC00681414/Lookup/coffeebroweblayout/$file/coffeebroweblayout.p
df (last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
269. Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260, at 22-24.
270. Interviews with members of the COOPAC cooperative, Gisenyi, Rwanda, ( Mar. 16 2006);
Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 20.
271. The proportion of Hutu to Tutsi ranged from 54% Hutu (to 38% Tutsi) to 83% Hutu (to 13%
Tutsi) across the locations. Intergroup Contact, supra note 13, at 38. Although the study's sample
represents a minority of coffee farmers in Rwanda, i.e. those benefiting from the results of privatization
in Rwanda's coffee sector, and the survey design prohibits generalizations beyond the group examined,
the observed correlations match current theories of reconciliation and are corroborated by journalistic
evidence. Moreover, while correlation is not the same as causation, the absence of a correlation
suggests the absence of a causal relationship. Here, there are strong correlations. Id.
272. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 18. Because not all farmers were members of
cooperatives but sold their cherries to private washing stations, we used a 5 year time horizon as a
reference point for these participants as opposed to membership in a cooperative. Id. Part VII offers a
more in-depth discussion of private washing stations.
273. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 19.
274. Id. at question 21.
275. Id. at question 38.
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There are a number of reasons to believe these benefits will continue. 276
While growth worldwide in ordinary-grade coffee consumption remains modest,
the consumption of high-quality specialty coffee (currently 7% of the coffee
volume in the international market) is rising by 20% annually.277 Even with
increased competition and somewhat lower prices, Rwanda's specialty coffees
should continue to command a good price. 278 In 2006, coffee exports were
expected to grow from 17,000 to 21,000 metric tons-a 23.5% increase-and
generate $46 billion in revenue-which would mark a 21% increase from 2005
figures.279 Coffee, along with tea, still earns more than 50% of Rwanda's trade
revenue, 280 and the amount of fully washed coffee is also rising as the number of
washing stations increases.
281
In an interview in 2006, Rwanda's then-Minister of Agriculture, Anastase
Murekezi, said that the specialty coffee industry's most successful story to date (in
terms of wealth being created for Rwandans) was with American companies.
282
Importers such as Starbucks and Green Mountain buy Rwandan coffee, bringing
much needed income to smallholders,283 but so too are less well-known but highly
discriminating American importers such as Intelligensia, Thanksgiving, and
Counter Culture Coffee.284
As noted above, several NGOs have helped Rwandans take advantage of this
liberalized environment, providing training and technical assistance and helping
farmers develop relationships with foreign buyers. For example, US AID has used
part of its relatively small budget in Rwanda to support rural economic growth
through three coffee-related projects: the Partnership for Enhancing Agriculture
276. RWANDA NEWS AGENCY, supra note 265 (noting that through July, 2008 export revenue for
Rwandan coffee was reported to be $15 million, up from $6.8 million for the whole of 2007).
277. Specialty Coffee Statistics & Coffee Facts, http://www.e-
importz.com/Support/specialty-coffee.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
278. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: RWANDA (2007), (observing that in its
2007 Country Report on Rwanda, the Economist Intelligence Unit notes: "Stagnation in many of the
traditional coffee-drinking markets of North America and Western Europe will restrict growth in
demand, although demand for high-quality specialty coffees, including Rwanda's finest fully washed
Arabica, will remain more buoyant.").
279. Reuters, Rwanda 2006 Coffee Output Seen at 21,000 T, FLEXNEWS, Oct. 19, 2006,
http://www.flexnews.com/pages/5321/Africa/Coffee/rwanda_2006_coffee-output-seen_21000_t.html.
280. TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY REPORT, RWANDA-REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT,
WT/TPR/G/129 (Aug. 31, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr e/g129_e.doc
(noting that "The chief cash crops are tea and coffee, which provide more than half of Rwanda's export
revenue.").
281. Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260.
282. Interview with Anastase Murekezi, Minister of Agriculture, Rwanda, in Kigali, Rwanda, (Mar.
14, 2006) (on file with author).
283. See Laura Fraser, Coffee, and Hope, Grow in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, § 3, at 31.
284. Description of Rwandan Intelligentsia Coffee,
http://www.intelligentsiacoffee.com/origin/offerings/02-15-2008; Description of Thanksgiving Coffee's
use of Cooperatives in Rwanda, http://www.thanksgivingcoffee.com/cooperatives; description of
Counter Culture Coffee's use of Rwandan Coffee,
http://www.counterculturecoffee.com/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=606&Itemid=49.
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through Linkages (PEARL), the Agricultural Cooperative Development
International/Volunteers Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI-VOCA), and the
Agribusiness Development Assistance Project in Rwanda (ADAR).
285
Each group has made important contributions to strengthening the coffee
sector. For example, the PEARL project, working closely with the National
University of Rwanda in Butare focused on helping farmers form cooperatives to
produce high-quality specialty coffee.286 PEARL team members taught local
growers how to improve their quality-control measures, develop effective
marketing strategies, and create beneficial relationships with specialty coffee
importers.287 PEARL has helped thirteen cooperatives win government approval,
and also assisted coffee washing stations by helping to improve quality-control
capabilities, improving market access, and improving management skills.
288
Whether these cooperatives can develop effective management structures remains
an open question, one the new SPREAD project (an outgrowth of PEARL) is
attempting to address.
289
Trainers and buyers from Europe, China, and Japan are also routinely visiting
the country, bringing expertise that helps improve the local industry, as well as
income to farmers. Minister Murekezi said: "You see richness growing and
poverty decreasing. You see people happier, more children at school, more homes
being improved, more people in savings schemes for health. And people say they
want to continue to improve their lives through coffee.,
2 90
In the 2006 interview, the Minister also noted that in the areas around
washing stations, employment and revenues are both rising. Besides increased
incomes for farmers, the benefits from specialty coffee extend beyond the
cooperative. Goff notes: "[A]s income levels of the cooperative members have
increased so has the flow of money in the community.... The positive feelings
among community members are a reflection of increased incomes in the area (of
the cooperatives). 29' Coffee production cannot, by itself, solve the many
285. Chemonics Int'l, supra note 267, at 15-16 (noting that budgets for these projects have been
relatively small: ACDI-VOCA's budget was approximately $600,000 from 2001 to 2003; ADAR and
PEARL had annual budgets of approximately $1.5 million. ADAR and PEARL were six-year projects).
286. Id. at 16.
287. Id. at 32, 33, 39.
288. See generally Partnership to Enhance Agriculture in Rwanda through Linkages,
http://www.iia.msu.edu/pearl/index.htm (discussing PEARL's functions); see also Swanson & Bagaza,
supra note 260, and Intergroup Contact, supra note 13, at 26 (explaining that the PEARL project was
succeed by a new project know as SPREAD (Sustaining Partnership to enhance Rural Enterprise and
Agribusiness Development). SPREAD currently assists 15 coffee cooperative and 5 privately owned
coffee ventures. SPREADS also assists with technical support and health care services. 95 coffee
washing stations, 9 of which are privately owned. 20,000 farmers are associated with the cooperatives
that receive assistance from SPREAD, and 5000 farmers sell to private washing stations that have also
benefited from SPREAD.).
289. Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260, at 26-36.
290. Murekezi interview, supra note 282.
291. Samuel Neal Goff, A Case Study of the Management of Cooperatives in Rwanda, 70 (2006)
(unpublished Master's thesis, Texas A&M University) (on file with Texas A&M University Libraries).
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problems these farmers face. Indeed, it remains to be seen if the benefits of coffee-
sector liberalization will continue to flow to the rural poor. Taken together,
concerns over the quality of cooperative management, the government's coffee
agency, and a problematic land law292 may bode ill for farmers.293 However, if
capacity issues can be addressed and harmful government interference avoided,
then the positive gains of the past several years might translate into continued
economic and social benefits for Rwanda's poor farmers.
VI. ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND CONFLICT
Economic liberalization entails reforms that "extend the scope of the market,
and in particular of international markets. 29 4  Political liberalization seeks to
expand democracy, strengthen and broaden participation in the political arena,
increase voice for all members of society.295 While both sets of reforms may be
jointly pursued one often precedes the other (as in South Korea and China).
The goal of economic liberalization is a more open economy. Typical
strategies for accomplishing the goal are privatization, deregulation, reductions in
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, elimination of price controls and subsidies,
and the removal of barriers to investment.296 Structural adjustment programs
(SAPs) were one manifestation of economic liberalization and a common feature
of IMF lending in the 1980s and 90S. 2 97 SAPs typically required developing world
governments to change their monetary policies to reduce inflation, to reduce tariff
rates, to shrink government budgets and to privatize state-owned industries.298
292. Organic Law Determining the Use and Management of Land in Rwanda § 20 No. 8/2005
Gazeti ya leta ya Rebublika Rwandaise, Sept. 15, 2005.
293. See Goff, supra note 291 (discussing management concerns at coffee cooperatives in
Rwanda); see Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260, at 9 (discussing current concerns with cooperative
management and capacity). For a discussion of the problematic role played by OCIR-Caf6 see Karol
Boudreaux, State Power, Entrepreneurship and Coffee: the Rwandan Experience, 15 MERCATUS POL'Y
SERIES 1, 22-23, (2007). Boudreaux also discusses the troubling 2005 Land Law. Id. On the concerns
raised by the Land Law see also, Johan Pottier, Land Reform for Peace? Rwanda's 2005 Land Law in
Context, 6 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 509 (2005), and Herman Musahara, Improving Tenure Security for
the Rural Poor: Rwanda-Country Case Study (LEP/FAO Working Paper No.7, 2006), and Int'l
Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Dev., A Case Study On the Implications of the Ongoing
Land Reform on Sustainable and Rural Development and Poverty Reduction in Rwanda And The
Outcome Report of the Thematic Dialogue (Jan. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Implications Case Study], and
Saskia Van Hoyweghen, The Urgency of Land and Agrarian Reform in Rwanda, 98 AFR. AFF. 353
(1999).
294. Francesco Giavazzi & Guido Tabellini, Economic and Political Liberalizations, 52 J.
MONETARY ECON. 1297, 1298 (2005).
295. See, e.g., POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION & DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD 3-4 (Rex
Brynen et al. eds., 1995).
296. Global Trade Negotiations Home Page,
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html.
297. See Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, The IMF's Role in StructuralAdjustment, 109 The
Econ. J. 634, 634 (1999). See also J. Barry Riddell, Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment
Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 53(1992).
298. Morris Goldstein, IMF Structural Conditionality: How Much is Too Much? (Institute of
International Economics Working Paper No. 4, 2000).
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This conditional lending has been widely criticized for imposing the costs of
"austerity" measures on the people least able to bear them: the developing world's
299poor.
An extensive literature explores the role that economic and political
liberalization play in promoting peaceful relations among nations and in intrastate
conflicts. 30 0 The key insight of this work-which is also known as the "liberal
peace thesis"-is that market-oriented democracies rarely go to war against each
other.30' Polacheck and Seiglie, for example, write that "countries with the most
trade (and the greatest gains from trade) have the most to lose from conflict.
Ceteris paribus, these countries have lesser amounts of conflict. 30 2 They go on to
argue that, "nation pairs with more trade exhibit less conflict and democracy-pairs
exhibit more trade." 303 The liberal peace thesis also applies to intrastate conflict,
as market democracies experience lower levels of internal conflict, rebellion,
assassination, and other disturbances than do authoritarian regimes or closed
304economies.
Extending this insight, commercial activities within a country, which typically
require collaborative efforts to bring goods or services to the market, may also act
as a catalyst for generating trust.30 5  Such collaboration can contribute to the
299. See generally, Storey, supra note 17.
300. Michael Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1151 (1989); Cramer,
supra note 17, at 202-05; R.J. RUMMEL, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR, VOL. 4: WAR, POWER,
PEACE (1979).
301. See generally John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative
Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict, 36 J. PEACE RES. 423, 433, 439 (1999) (noting that "there
is statistically significant evidence for the pacific benefits of economi- cally important trade" as well as
joint democracy); see generally Hivard Hegre, Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does it Take
to be a Trading State? 37 J. PEACE RES. 5, 17 (2000) (concluding that the pacifying effect of trade
increases with increased development but that in cases where a trading pair includes one country that is
very poor, GDP per capita of less than $300, increased interdependence may increase the incidence of
fatal disputes); see generally Cullen F. Goenner, Uncertainty of the Liberal Peace, 41 J. OF PEACE RES.
589, 600 (2004) (discussing the three main theoretical approaches to liberal peace and finding that while
trade interdependence is not a strong predictor of military conflict democracy is.); see generally Dale C.
Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations, 20 INT'L SECURITY 5
(1996) (arguing that interdependence can foster peace only when states expect that trade will be high
into the foreseeable future and that when expectations for future trade are low, the most highly
dependent states will be the ones most likely to initiate war for fear of losing economic wealth that
supports long-term security).
302. Solomon Polachek & Carlos Seiglie, Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic
Dispute 14 (IZA Discussion Paper No. 2170, 2006).
303. Id. at 48.
304. See Mirjam E. Sorli, The Liberal Peace Argument in the Middle East: Ali in Wonderland or
Crude (Oil) Reality? (Sept. 8, 2001) (unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Oslo), available at
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-68957771/file38409-canterbury-mirjam.pdf (analyzing the liberal peace
theory on an interstate and an intrastate level. Regarding the liberal peace theory, the author states,
"Democracy and economic growth are today seen as the main ingredients in a recipe for a
peaceful world.").
305. See, e.g., T. Saguy & A. Nadler, Social psychology and the process of trust building:
Interviews with Israelis and Palestinians involved in joint projects, 44 MEGAMOT, 2006, at 354. Our
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development of a new, shared identity among members of different groups,
30 6
thereby reducing prejudice among previously hostile groups.
30 7
The idea that a "liberal peace" exists is not new, but renewed interest in the
subject over the past twenty years has generated a large body of theoretical and
empirical work.30 8 In addition, the claim that liberal market democracies are more
peaceful than other societies provided support for efforts to export both democracy
and free-market economic policies to countries lacking these institutions. 9
However, the liberal peace thesis has its critics. 310 As Paris notes, it might be
the case that existing liberal democracies are peaceful, but the shift from
authoritarianism and/or a closed economy to market liberalism can be fraught with
conflict.311 Some liberalization policies, such as those adopted in Rwanda in the
early 1990s, impoverish, rather than enrich or empower, the poor. 312  Some
privatization efforts benefit political insiders at the expense of the broader
fieldwork supports this hypothesis. When polled on levels of trust towards buyers, 32% of farmers
indicated intermediate and high levels of trust previously (i.e. 5 years ago or alternatively before joining
the cooperative), whereas 89% indicated intermediate and high levels of trust now. Field Study 2008,
supra note 251, at question 17.
306. For a discussion of social identity theory see generally Matthew J. Hornsey, Social Identity
Theory and Self-categorization Theory: A Historical Review, 2/1 SOC. AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOL.
COMPASS 204, 204-06 (2008), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.111 1/j.1751-9004.2007.00066.x.
307. Samuel L. Gaertner et al., How does Cooperation Reduce Intergroup Bias? 59, No. 4 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL., 692 (Oct. 1990) (showing how intergroup cooperation may
contribute to the development of a new, shared identity among previously hostile groups); MUZAFER
SHERIF, IN COMMON PREDICAMENT: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT & COOPERATION
(Houghton-Mifflin 1966) (suggesting that when two parties who have experienced conflict over limited
resources are faced with a superordinate goal- task or challenge that both groups want to have resolved,
and that requires joint effort- hostile behavior subsides); see also GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE (Oxford, 1954): Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact: Theory, Research and New
Perspectives, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 65, 65-71 (1998) (providing evidence how positive interaction
between antagonistic groups can lead to reductions in prejudice and hostility).
308. For a sense of the literature, see, e.g., John R. O'Neal, Frances H. O'Neal, Zeev Maoz &
Bruce Russett, The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict, 1950-85,
33 (1) J. PEACE RES. 11, 11 (1996); see also John O'Neal & Bruce Russett, Clear and Clean: The
Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace, 55 (2) INT'L ORG. 469, 469-71 (2001); see also Michael Mosseau,
Hivard Hegre & John R. O'Neal, How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the Liberal Peace, 9 (2) EUR.
J. INT'L REL. 277,278 (2003).
309. Paris, supra note 17, at 44.
310. Katherine Barbieri & Gerald Schneider, Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions
in the Study of Trade and Conflict, 36 (4) J. OF PEACE REs., 387 (1999); Cullen Goenner, Uncertainty
of the Liberal Peace, 41 (5) J. PEACE RES., 589, 589-90 (2004); Erik Gartzke, Quan Li &
Charles Boehmer, Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict, 55
INT'L ORG., 391 (2001).
311. Paris, supra note 17, at 44; CRAMER, supra note 17, at 204-205 (arguing that "[t]he liberal free
trade vision of capitalism . prettifies reality in two main ways. First, it glosses over the reality of
how capitalism takes root in a society and how societies have developed into advanced capitalist
societies. The beginnings and the effective and progressive development of capitalism are always
painful.").
312. Storey, Structural Adjustment, supra note 23, at 375-77.
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society.3 13 When liberalization policies benefit the few and the favored at the
expense of the majority of a citizenry, creating or exacerbating economic
cleavages, they may prompt conflict.314 Therefore, how liberalization policies are
crafted may help determine if they are conflict-generating or conflict-reducing.
In Rwanda, liberalization policies in the coffee sector have imposed some
costs on farmers (the costs associated with developing and marketing a high-
quality product) but, foreign aid projects implemented by NGOs have both off-set
these costs and have helped farmers develop valuable market linkages needed to
compete globally. 315 These projects have also helped farmers form cooperatives,
improve their product, raise capital, identify buyers, and learn how to negotiate
contracts.3 16 Providing farmers with the skills needed to transition from producing
low-quality commercial grade coffee to high-quality specialty coffee has been an
important part of transformation in Rwanda's coffee sector.317 Government
policies creating greater scope for local decision making and for entrepreneurship,
coupled with support from the development community, have energized this
sector. Unlike other liberalizations, the benefits of the coffee-sector liberalization
are spread broadly. 318 Any farmer can choose to grow coffee.3 19 No one ethnic
group seems to be benefiting at the expense of another. To date, the reforms seem
to be conflict-reducing rather than conflict-enhancing.32 °
VII. COOPERATION AND RECONCILIATION
The economic imperatives discussed above mean that for many smallholders
there are potential benefits from joining together in cooperatives to produce and
process coffee. Most Rwandan coffee farmers are smallholders, and they face
serious obstacles identifying possible foreign buyers, marketing their product, and
negotiating sales contracts.32' Sharing costs and spreading risks is a sensible
strategy for many of these farmers, so they join together in cooperatives.
322
313. KATHERINE VERDERY, THE VANISHING HECTARE: PROPERTY AND VALUE IN POSTSOCIALIST
TRANSYLVANIA 113-14 (Cornell University, 2003).
314. Cannon, supra note 44, at 42.
315. See supra Part V.
316. Karol Boudreaux, Comment, State Power, Entrepreneurship, and Coffee: The Rwandan
Experience, MERCATUS POL'Y SERIES, Policy Comment No. 15, at 5, 8, 17, 27, Oct. 2007.
317. Id. at 15.
318. Id. at 12, 18.
319. Id. at 8.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 29.
322. Id. Discussing work done over the course of a number of years, Fort and Schipiani identify
four possible contributions that business can make towards the creation of more peaceful societies.
These contributions include: fostering economic development and creating jobs, adopting external
evaluation principles, "creating a sense of connectedness among members of an organization" and in
mediating power contests. For our purposes, the role that local businesses (cooperatives and/or private
washing stations) play in terms of economic development, job creation, and encouraging connectedness
among members are of key importance. See Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipani, An Action Plan
for the Role of Businesses in Fostering Peace, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 359, 364-67 (2007); see also, Thomas
W. Dunfee & Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Hypergoals, Sustainable Peace, & the Adapted Firm, 36
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Compared to individual production, well-run cooperatives can give smallholders a
leg up in a competitive marketplace and provide other benefits that are sorely
lacking, such as small loans, agricultural inputs, training, and a social forum.
323
Cooperatives are not new in Rwanda.324 Uvin writes that hundreds of
cooperatives were created in the 1980s and thousands of less formal farmers'
organizations were also started during this time.325 A US AID report says that the
Habyarimana government had an "associez-vous, on vas vous aider" policy "but
without there necessarily being a real reason for associating., 326  Today, the
Rwandan government encourages the formation of cooperatives, but is not directly
327involved in running cooperatives. Farmers who choose not to be members of
cooperatives have alternatives of selling their cherries to private buyers or to
private coffee washing stations. 328  These "middlemen" will sell the cherries to
millers and/or exporters.
329
Because bringing coffee to the market requires significant coordination
amongst workers at cooperatives and private washing stations,330 both
organizations may facilitate cooperation. 331  An International Alert study from
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 594 (2003).
323. See Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260, at 14 (describing the cooperative management
structure and polled benefits).
324. Chemonics Int'l, supra note 267, at. 8. In a summary report, US AID notes: "[p]rior to the
establishment of the COOPACABI coffee cooperative in Bicumbi in 1996, no coffee cooperatives
existed in Rwanda. Farmers sold semi-washed coffee directly to RWANDEX agents, at prices pre-
determined by the GOR (Government of Rwanda). However, coffee producer associations did exist, but
served the limited function of input distribution (and eventual reimbursement) of products supplied by
OCIR-Caf&." USAID, Assessing USAID'S Investments In Rwanda's Coffee Sector: Best Practices and
Lessons Learned to Consolidate Results and Expand Impact, April 2006,
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PNADG793.pdf.
325. UvIN, supra note 50, at 164-65.
326. Translates roughly: "if you join together we will help you." See Interview with Tom Bagaza,
Producer Relations Coordinator, SPREAD, Kigali, Rwanda (Feb. 19, 2008) (explaining that before
1994, OCIR-Cafe encouraged farmers to form associations so that it could deliver agricultural inputs to
centralized locations rather than to individual farmers - so coffee associations made the government's
job of supporting farmers easier, they did not have a strong business focus.).
327. Chemonics Int'l, supra note 323, at 12-13.
328. See, e.g., USAID, The Ties That Bind: Case Studies in Making Buyer-Supplier Relationships
Last, Research Report, July 2007, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PNADL009.pdf.
329. Id. Interestingly, our field study found that 23% of coffee cooperative members reported
selling to their cooperative instead of private washing stations out of loyalty. Field Study 2008, supra
note 251, at question 17; see also supra text accompanying notes 260-61 for a description of the coffee
washing process and private washing stations. Of course, cooperatives are also a kind of a
"middleman." See id.
330. See infra text accompanying notes 400-404; see also note 305 for data regarding trust towards
buyers.
331. Discussing the role that multinational corporations can play in promoting peace, Fort argues:
"[clonceptually, businesses do possess the capability to reach across borders and to get people who may
not otherwise work together to do so, even if the only common goal they have if profitability. Some
businesses even intentionally hire employees from otherwise conflicting ethnic or religious groups in
order to get them to have the experience of cooperating." Timothy L. Fort, The Times and Seasons of
Corporate Responsibility,44 AM. Bus. L.J. 287, 322 (2007).
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2006 posits that in a post-conflict environment local business has a role to play by
facilitating the rebuilding of damaged societies and by promoting dialogue among
former enemies.332 Local businesses, this report argues, provide a space for people
to participate in joint economic activities:
Doing business may be one of the few remaining points of contact
between two sides in a conflict-and one of the first to resume in its
aftermath. In many instances, these points of contact are both
profitable and inspiring as they demonstrate that peaceful interaction
for mutual benefit is possible as well as desirable.
333
The exploratory survey mentioned above, coupled with journalistic evidence,
suggests that the increased collaboration (and economic rewards) that have resulted
from the pursuit of commercial activities in the coffee sectors is encouraging more
positive feelings towards others and towards reconciliation.
334
To provide further detail, the exploratory field survey we sponsored was
conducted in the June 2008. Coffee farmers 335 were asked ninety-four questions
related to their membership (if appropriate) in a coffee cooperative; the social
climate (either in a cooperative or the local community for people selling at private
washing stations); the economic benefits of coffee production; and their attitude
towards reconciliation with the other ethnic group (as well as demographic
questions).
Survey results suggest 336 that membership in a coffee cooperative, being
associated with a particular coffee washing station comparatively longer, and
economic as well as general life satisfaction are significant correlates of positive
attitudes towards reconciliation.337  In particular, participants with greater
332. International Alert, Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic
Private Sector - Executive Summary, available at http://www.intemational-
alert.org/pdf/LBLPRussian-exec-sum.pdf.
333. Id.
334. Reconciliation can be defined as a change in identity. Herbert C. Kelman, Reconciliation as
Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO
RECONCILIATION 111 (Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, Ed.) (Oxford University Press 2004). It can also be
defined as a change in psychological orientation towards the other, involving mutual acceptance
between groups, Ervin Staub, Reconciliation After Genocide, Mass Killing or Intractable Conflict:
Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery and Steps Toward a General Theory,
27(6) POL. PSYCHOL., 867, 868 (2006). Another definition is a process involving reciprocating
empathy and compassion as well as a peaceful expectation of future intergroup relationships Arie
Nadler & Ido Liviatan, Intergroup Reconciliation: Effects of Adversary's Expressions of Empathy,
Responsibility, and Recipients' Trust, 32 (4) PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 459, 462 (2006).
335. Field Study 2008, supra note 251 (discussing the demographic polled).
336. Id. Although the study's sample represents a minority of coffee farmers in Rwanda, i.e. those
benefiting from the results of privatization in Rwanda's coffee sector, and the survey design prohibits
generalizations beyond the group examined, the observed correlations match current theories of
reconciliation and are corroborated by journalistic evidence. Moreover, while correlation is not the
same as causation, the absence of a correlation suggests the absence of a causal relationship. Here, there
are strong correlations. See, e.g., Staub, supra note 334, at 874; Kelman, supra note 334, at 24.
337. Field Study 2008, supra note 251.
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economic security reported low distrust towards members of the other ethnic
group, and a tendency towards conditional forgiveness. 338 Coffee washing stations
that had been in operation for a comparatively longer period of time were also
significantly correlated with a reduction in ethnic distance over time.339  Life
satisfaction significantly correlated with economic security variables, and those
farmers reporting greater satisfaction with life also expected a more positive,
peaceful future in Rwanda.340 These observations were discernible independent of
gender, education, the participants' ethnicity or the ethnic mix at a location.34 1
The survey also revealed a change in attitudes over time. Of the participants
that reported disagreements in their community, 75% reported fewer
disagreements 342 today than in the past (i.e. since joining the cooperative or, for
non-cooperative members, in the past five years).343 Conversely, 91% of all survey
respondents reported that conflicts are better resolved today than in the past.3"
When polled on levels of trust towards buyers, 32% of farmers indicated
intermediate and high levels of trust before, whereas 89% indicated intermediate
and high levels of trust now. 34 5 Perhaps the most suggestive data was the increase
in farmers willing to engage in socially inclusive behavior today in comparison to
the past.346 Out of the three-quarters of participants who answered questions about
their willingness to greet a member of the other ethnic group, work with this
person every day, share a beer, or allow their child to marry such a person, the
percentage of those who engaged in such social behavior today, compared to the
past, had more than doubled across all questions.347 Moreover, 46% of the
respondents who answered these questions reported that they had not carried out
any of these social acts in the past.348 Only 1% reported not doing so today.349
Interestingly, the survey data further suggests that membership at
cooperatives provides greater economic and social benefits. Members of coffee
cooperatives were more likely to have experienced a positive change in economic
338. Id. at questions 55, 60.
339. Id. at questions 61-62.
340. Id. at questions 55, 60.
341. Id. at question 55.
342. At cooperatives, the main disagreement is how money is used. Other disagreements (at both
cooperative and private washing stations) include how much farmers are paid for cherries, job
opportunities, and how benefits are shared. Id. at question 25.
343. Id. at question 24.
344. Throughout the survey, the past was framed as since joining the cooperative for cooperative
members. For non-cooperative members, the past was defined as five years ago. Id. at question 48.
345. For cooperative members, the past was defined as since joining the cooperative. For non-
cooperative members, the past was defined as five years ago. Id. at question 17.
346. Not all participants answered these questions (approximately 75% did). However, given that
the question was framed towards the present and the past, it's unlikely that a participant would feel
compelled to answer positive towards one and not the other, and moreover, answer positive to the
present but not to the past. Field Study 2008, supra note 251.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at question 52.
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satisfaction, and also rated their life satisfaction today higher than coffee workers
not associated with a cooperative. They were also less likely to report high
distrust. Members also reported more positive contact affect as well as
350significantly deeper contact with members of the other ethnic group.
As noted above, this survey was exploratory in nature. These results do not
establish a causal link between economic liberalization and informal reconciliation.
Rather, they suggest that in these particular settings coffee farmers are
experiencing a variety of positive benefits, including lower levels of distrust
towards members of the other ethnic group, when economic benefits are
experienced. To the extent that broad-based economic liberalization creates
opportunities for increased positive collaboration and economic benefits, levels of
trust and feelings about reconciliation among former enemies may improve-an
important insight for policy making options in post-conflict environments.
This survey work was inspired by a body of journalistic evidence that
identifies a link between working in a cooperative and reconciliation. For
example, a 2006 article in the New York Times tells the story of Gemima
Mukashyaka, a member of the Maraba coffee cooperative.3 5' Ms. Mukashyaka
lost most of her family during the genocide.352 Her life was spared only because a
young Hutu man intervened with the Interahamwe militia and bought her.353 After
the killing ended she escaped and, with two surviving sisters, returned to her
family farm, only to find it devastated.354 Laura Fraser writes, "After joining the
co-op, Ms. Mukashyaka doubled her coffee earnings in one year. She also grew
less isolated and less distrustful of her neighbors, since she had people to talk to at
the washing station and in co-op meetings. ' 355 Gemma Uwera, another member of
the Maraba co-op is quoted as saying:
After the genocide, I feared other people's reaction when they got to
know that my husband is in jail, so it was not easy to join the co-op....
Now I have friends, I meet regularly with widows of genocide, and we
plan how we can help each other if someone has a problem.
356
A Christian Science Monitor story discusses Jeannette Nyirabaganwa, who
lost her husband, parents, and a child in the genocide. 7 Anastaz Turimubakunzi
is, the report says, "a confessed killer who, Jeannette says, helped murder her
350. Id. at question 56.







356. Id.; see also Coffee 'Key to Reconciling Rwandans', BRIT. BROAD. CORP.,
http://news.bbe.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5299286.stm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
357. Abraham McLaughlin, Why Jeannette Employs Her Family's Killers, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1024/pOlsO3-woaf html.
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husband." '358 Today, Jeannette runs a coffee farm and pays Anastaz to work in her
fields. Jeannette explains how it is possible for her to work with a man who helped
kill her husband: "The only solution was to go together with my countrymen -
even the killers. There was no alternative.,, 359 So in 1999, a group of neighbors
decided to start a coffee cooperative, the Abahuzamugambi Cooperative.
360
Jeannette wanted to participate to increase her income, but that was not her only
motive. She is quoted as saying: "I thought that coffee-growing could connect me
to other people. 361  Jeannette goes on to say that because of the cooperative
"we've been building a relationship that changed our lives. We ended up
reconciling in a way we didn't know." And this, the story argues: "is a tale of
Rwandan-style reconciliation. It may seem almost incomprehensible to outsiders,
yet in some cases it works here." 362 In a different report, Fatuma Ngangiza, head
of Rwanda's National Unity and Reconciliation Commission says of coffee
farmers, "[as] they work together, cleaning the coffee, they talk together so they
start talking business but later they start talking family affairs. It fosters
relationships and reconciliation.,
363
There is some research that suggests that women have played a particularly
important role in reconciliation efforts in Rwanda. 364 After the genocide, women
like Gemima and Gemma, one a survivor, the other married to an alleged
perpetrator, returned to ruined farms. 365 There were few able-bodied men at the
time available to work so the women, on their own, had to manage their farms and
feed and care for their children.366 In a desperate situation it is reasonable to
imagine they would recognize the benefits of working together cooperatively in
order to rebuild their lives and livelihoods.367
358. Id.
359. Id.; see also Jim Fisher-Thompson, U.S. Interests in Conflict and Coffee Combine to help
Rwanda, WASH. FILE, May 28, 2006, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2006/May/20060528102558nospmohtrehsifjO.6521723.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2008)
(quoting Steven Livingston, who states: "[w]ith the coffee cooperatives and role of Starbucks" (which
has purchased Rwandan coffee for its Black Apron product line) "'and other coffee companies
interested in Rwanda what we see is that if you give people the expectations of hope from economic
development' ethnic tensions are lessened.").
360. McLaughlin, supra note 357.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. BRIT. BROAD. CORP., supra note 355; see also Land of a Thousand Hills Coffee,
http://www.landofl000hills.com/learn/our-story (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
364. ELIZABETH POWLEY, STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN RWANDA'S
TRANSITION (Sanam Naraghi Anderlini ed., 2003), available at
http://www.huntaltematives.org/download/10-strengthening-govemance the-role-of women in rwan
da_s transition.pdf.
365. Fraser, supra note 351.
366. Id.
367. Powley, supra note 364, at 16 (citing one interviewee: "[m]ost of the widows have children to
take care of. Naturally they find that they can't cope on their own. Even if she is a [genocide] survivor
in the middle of all those people she thinks were against her, she is forced to work with them because
she has nobody to turn to .... Women need more cooperation in the community.").
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Our field study supports the journalistic evidence that women have played an
important role in reconciliation and suggests further that women are enjoying
greater empowerment in post-conflict Rwanda. Ninety-two percent of those., - 368
surveyed believed that women contributed significantly to reconciliation, and
79% believed that women definitely play a large role in resolving conflict. 3 69
When farmers were asked if it is better to have a man in change, 59% of those
surveyed responded definitely not3 70 (49% of those surveyed were women 371).
When asked if men make better peace-makers, 53% strongly or moderately
disagreed.372 While this area requires further research, the evidence suggests that
opportunities present in the liberalized coffee sector are benefiting women.
Women are enjoying greater economic empowerment and a political voice. Eighty-
six percent reported that participation of women in decision-making had improved
since the joining the cooperative or, alternatively, in the past five years in the
community. 373  Seventy-one percent believed that women could participate in
374decision-making as much as men.
The anecdotal/journalistic and survey evidence presented is not dispositive
but rather strongly suggestive of the role that necessity and economic opportunity
can play in improving relations among former enemies and also possibly
empowering previously disenfranchised groups, like women. However, the
Rwandan experience raises a challenging question: does this cooperative behavior
represent merely a short-term and necessitous change or is it likely to be something
more substantial, a long-term shift in behavior and perspective? In other words, is
cooperation in cooperatives prompting informal reconciliation or something else?
The answer is still unclear. However, the Rwandan coffee sector has become
a forum for people of all groups to engage in repeat dealings and to work jointly in
pursuit of a common goal: making ends meet. Working together to achieve a goal
that everyone desires-earning a better living-seems to be helping some farmers
overcome animosities. People in Rwanda recognize that commercial activities
generally, and the coffee industry specifically, are a potential path to
reconciliation. Dr. Timothy Schilling of PEARL has said that:
By bringing villagers together to work toward a common economic
goal... co-ops have helped Rwandans with the monumental task of
reconciliation, since genocide widows work side by side with women
whose husbands are in jail for participating in the killing.... What's
reconciliation if it's not people who have conflict getting together and
talking?
3 75
368. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 58.
369. Id. at question 27.
370. Id. at question 42.
371. Id. at question 87.
372. Id. at question 79.
373. Id. at question 49.
374. Id. at question 41.
375. Fraser, supra note 350.
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Similarly, Rwandan Minister of Agriculture Murekezi, argued:
Industry has certainly contributed to reconciliation.., in every village
we've had this very bad experience with genocide. Coffee producers
were both victims and killers. Afterwards, the killers were imprisoned.
Their wives and their children were at home. Close by were the
survivors of the genocide. The victims were living next to the families
of those killed. But now we have the experience of people working
together. We have seen coffee producers working together.
I believe the secret is increasing income through washing coffee.
This is the same concern for all the families. They are working together
now through co-ops. The co-ops are friendly associations. These
farmers are getting more income now than in the past, and they are
happy to get more because they are working together. Now, we can
value each family based on [its] real achievements in improving quality
and quantity of coffee, not on ethnicity. This is a new value: a focus on
work and results.
37 6
Minister Murekezi suggested that people now work together precisely
because of the market signals associated with specialty coffee production.377
Specialty coffee fetches higher prices so more farmers would like to produce it.
378
To do this, they often join a cooperative. Once they are members of a cooperative,
they have an opportunity to work with other farmers to accomplish a shared
goal.379  The stories above, and our survey results, suggest this joint effort
produces positive social benefits as well. If, as seems to be the case, Rwanda's
inclusive liberalization catalyzes inter-group cooperation then, importantly,
policies that expand economic opportunity for many citizens provide an additional
strategy for post-conflict reconciliation.
VIII. REASONS FOR CAUTION IN THE COFFEE SECTOR
The specialty coffee industry is doing good things in Rwanda. However, the
smallholder farmers and the entrepreneurs who work in this sector face several
challenges. These include improving the management of cooperatives to benefit
members, limiting the possibility of harmful interference by OCIR-Caf6, the
government-run coffee board, and avoiding dislocations to poor Rwandans,
particularly women, that may result from the 2005 Land Law. 380 These issues are
discussed below.
A. The Need for Better Cooperative Management
A serious challenge for smallholders who voluntarily join together into
cooperatives is to create a culture of entrepreneurship within the cooperatives so




380. See generally Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260.
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that cooperatives become more "business minded., 381 A key problem identified by
the SPREAD project is the need to attract and retain more professional managers
in cooperatives and, at the same time, to reduce the influence of volunteer Boards
of Directors (BOD). 382 A recent assessment of a group of Rwandan cooperatives
states "[a] professional, entrepreneurial General Manager is the most important
individual to a cooperative's ultimate success.
'383
However, the report's authors find that no cooperatives in the group under
investigation have such a manager. The reason for this seems to be that the BODs
are reluctant to pay high enough salaries to attract a professional manager.
384
Further, the BOD often prefers to have a local person, rather than an "outsider," fill
this role. 385 However, locals are less likely to have the skill set needed to manage
the cooperative effectively. Cooperatives are capable of producing very high
quality coffee, but they are experiencing real difficulties creating effective
management structures.386
A related problem is that the BOD often interferes inappropriately in the daily
management of the cooperative. The assessment notes that "BOD members,
particularly Presidents, do not want to relinquish their authority to a strong General
Manager., 387 While it is essential that the BOD take seriously its fiduciary duties
to create general policies and oversee management activities, the assessment
recommends that they give managers increased decision-making authority and
discretion.
388
Management of the cooperatives, BOD and professional managers, need to
communicate more effectively with members so that members understand the
ownership structure of the cooperative as well as the rights members hold.389 To
date, this has not been done effectively. Members report that they are unclear as to
who "owns" the cooperative, 390 and some believe cooperative leaders are over
compensated for their work.391  Cooperatives also need to develop and
communicate effective business plans and to improve financial record keeping and
documentation. When members lack clear information about the financial state of
the cooperative, and about likely prices for cherries and benefits to cooperative
members, the possibility of corruption and conflict over resources rises. In our
field study, 41% of cooperative members had expected benefits they had not
381. Id. at 11.
382. Id. at 8.
383. Id. at 12.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 11.
386. Id. at 8.
387. Id. at 13.
388. Id. at 11.
389. Id. at 14, 15.
390. Id. at 14.
391. 55% moderately or strongly disagreed with the statement that "cooperative leaders get more
than they deserve." Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at question 46. 62% moderately or strongly
agreed with the statement that "cooperative leaders earn what they deserve." Id. at question 50.
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received, and about half moderately and strongly believed that there was anger in
the cooperative because benefits were not distributed fairly.392 These are
especially important issues to resolve because cooperatives are facing increasing
competition from other coffee entrepreneurs and must find a way to meet this
challenge.
393
Cooperatives have provided a pivotal role for Rwanda's smallholder farmers,
allowing them to earn more money from coffee, develop additional skills, and
work cooperatively with others in ways that may promote reconciliation.
However, cooperatives must now address serious shortcomings in terms of
management practices and capabilities if they hope to continue playing this role in
the future. There is, however, reason to be optimistic. In our field study,
approximately three-quarters of cooperative members indicated that their trust in
cooperative leaders had improved since joining, as has the level of participation
from ordinary farmers in cooperative decision-making.394 As cooperatives seem to
provide a space for cooperative behavior and even informal reconciliation, further
support efforts to help accomplish the goal of creating transparent and accountable
management may well be justified.
B. The Role of OCIR-Caf6
A different concern is that the government agency OCIR-Caf& may interfere
with positive developments in the industry.395 Although this agency's role has
been modified over time, OCIR-Caf6 continues to create policies and strategies for
the coffee sector to implement these policies and strategies, to set up quality norms
and classification systems, quality control, and delivery of Origin Certificates. 396 It
is also supposed to provide extension services, research, and training to farmers.397
OCIR-Caf& continues to supply some subsidized inputs to coffee farmers.
It is, however, the agency's role as the official "brander" of Rwandan coffee
that raises most concerns. The agency claims a key role in creating "quality norms
and classification systems," including the issuance of Origin Certificates. 398 In an
interview in March 2006, the then-Director General of OCIR-Caf6, Laurien
Ngirabanzi, argued that the government should help train producers to meet these
quality standards. 399  However, Mr. Ngirabanzi added that if farmers fail to
comply, the agency should consider fining them or seizing their crops.4
a°
392. Statements such as "'we buy fertilizer at the same price as non-coop members," "sometimes we
don't get profits," "promised to get bike (or loan) but not yet," "no subsidies, the prices are low," and
"inputs are not available for all" were common. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at questions 14, 15,
30.
393. Swanson & Bagaza, supra note 260, at 10.
394. Field Study 2008, supra note 251, at questions 45, 47.
395. OCIR-Caf6 is a department of Rwandan Ministry of Commerce. See The Role Of OCIR
Coffee In The Coffee Industry, WORLD INVESTMENT NEWS, available at




399. Interview with Laurien Ngirabanzi, Director General of OC1R-Caf6, in Kigali, Rwanda, (Mar.
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More recently, coffee dealers have been pressuring the agency to "abolish"
the traditional, dry-process production of coffee.40 1 Because the country has a
limited number of coffee washing stations, the majority of Rwandan coffee is still
processed in the traditional way-at home by smallholder farmers.40 2 These beans
are then sold to local dealers, who in turn, sell to exporters.4 3 Because home
processing does not ensure high quality, these beans command a lower price on the
market than does specialty coffee.40 4 While it is clearly a worthwhile goal to raise
farmers' incomes, the agency should, at best, educate farmers about the benefits of
washing coffee and avoid coercing farmers by seizing their home-based equipment
(as suggested by one coffee processor).40 5 For this industry to continue benefiting
smallholders, government involvement in the production process should be
limited.
In particular, there is little reason why a government agency needs to oversee
quality control functions and issue certifications of origin. Rather than entrust a
government agency, which is subject to a variety of political pressures, to handle
such tasks, private-sector organizations, such as the East African Fine Coffees
Association (EAFCA), can serve this role. EAFCA "is an association of coffee
producers, processors, marketing people, and organizations in the ten Eastern and
Southern African countries of Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo as
well as others from outside Africa.40 6 Membership thus includes processors,
associations, roasters, dealers, retailers, and coffee professionals from all over the
world., 40 7 The association conducts trade missions and creates linkages between
producers and buyers.40 8 It holds national cupping competitions to help improve
quality and sponsors an annual African Taste of Harvest competition in which
producers across East Africa compete.40 9 Not subject to the kinds of pressures that
a public institution faces, EAFCA already serves as a training resource, provides
quality control information, and assists with marketing.4 10
2006) (on file with author).
400. Since March 2006, several different people have filled the role of Director General of OCIR-
Cafe. Interview with Tom Bagaza, Assistant Director, SPREAD, in Kigali, Rwanda, (Feb. 18, 2008)
(on file with author).
401. Eugene Kwibuka, Rwanda: Country Must Enhance Traditional Ways of Milling Coffee






406. E. African Fine Coffees Ass'n, About Eastern African Fine Coffees Association (EAFCA),
http://www.eafca.org/about.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. E. African Fine Coffees Ass'n, What is the AToH&A?, http://www.eafca.org/atoh.htm (last




Unquestionably, Rwandan coffee producers and cooperative members have
many needs. They must improve a variety of skills; they must continue to improve
the quality of their product; and they must get more of their product to market in a
cost-effective manner.4 11 The question is not whether there are continuing needs
within the sector; the question is what is the best way to meet these needs? With
growing international acclaim for Rwandan specialty coffee,4 12 opportunities arise
for producers to partner with importers, to raise capital, and to improve production
processes. Creating private-sector partnerships may, in the long-run, be a more
effective strategy for ensuring the growth of Rwanda's coffee sector than is one
that relies too extensively on a centralized, government-run marketing board.
C. A Problematic Land Law
As an extremely scarce resource, land is highly contested in Rwanda: "[L]and
was a factor behind social tensions before every major open conflict. Even today,
more than 80% of all disputes in Rwanda are related to land.' '413 For much of its
history, Rwanda's rulers have owned most of the land.414 With control of land in
the hands of government, formal land markets did not develop. 4 15 Transfers often
took place informally, and confusion and insecurity were common.416  Local
officials had great discretion over land allocation and could favor politically
powerful individuals over marginalized people who may have held traditional use
rights.4 17
In 2003, the Rwandan Parliament approved a Land Reform Decree that
provides for individualized rights to property.418 This policy provided the basis for
the 2005 Land Law.419 The Land Law specifies that people or associations that
411. See Kwibuka, supra note 401.
412. This growing acclaim is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that for the first time, in 2008, an
African country hosted the Cup of Excellence coffee competition-the country was Rwanda. See Cup
of Excellence, 2008 Rwanda Program,
http://cupofexcellence.org/CountryPrograms/Rwanda/2008Program/tabid/418/Default.aspx (last visited
Sept. 8, 2008).
413. Implications Case Study, supra note 293; see also Van Hoyweghen, supra note 293.
414. See Rwanda-History, EAST AFRICA LIVING ENCYCLOPEDIA, African Studies Center at the
Univ. of Pa., http://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/rwhistory.htm (last visited November 11, 2008); see
also Tor Sellstrom and Lennart Wolgemuth, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:
Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, STEERING COMMITTEE OF JOINT EVALUATION OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA at Ch. 2, March 1996,
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/nordic/bookl/pb020.html.
415. Implications Case Study, supra note 293, at 11.
416. Id.
417. Id. (explaining that sales were restricted according the size of the buyer and seller's total land
holdings); see also Musahara, supra note 293, at 4.
418. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF LAND ISSUES, VOL. III, 2006-2007, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN
AFRICA 29-30 (Martin Adams and Robin Palmer eds., 2007), available at
http://www.kubatana.net/docs/landr/adams-palmer indepreviewland issues_0706.pdf.
419. Organic Law No. 08/2005 of 14/07/2005, Determining the Use and Management of Land in
Rwanda, July 14, 2005, http://www.minirena.gov.rw/IMG/pdf/LOI-ORGANIQUE-FONCIERE.pdf.
As of May, 2008 the Land Law had not yet been fully implemented as orders were still being drafted to
facilitate the implementation. Interview with Minister of Natural Resources in Kigali, Rwanda (June 3,
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own land via custom, or who have obtained land by previous purchase, or who
have previously acquired it from a "competent authority" are "allowed to own it on
long term lease., 420 These leases may be sold and transferred. Rural land is being
registered locally, and urban, commercial property will be registered in a national
cadastre in Kigali.42' The government maintains a role in the resettling of people
and in devising land-use and land-planning policy.
422
The government hopes the land law will promote the consolidation of land
holding.423 By permitting the sale of leaseholds, small parcels could be sold to
commercial farmers who will consolidate the land and create viable agri-
businesses. This is both good and potentially bad. Farmers who wish to sell their
land may benefit from a more formalized market. However, the law also contains
provisions that could force some farmers to give up small parcels of land.424 As
Musahara notes, small, dispersed land holdings serve as a kind of insurance policy
for subsistence farmers who would, in bad year, would risk losing all crops if land
were consolidated:
[L]and fragmentation in Rwanda serv[es] as a coping mechanism in
smallholder agriculture, the typical Rwandan household farms an
average of five plots. Some are in the valleys, others are upland and
some near the household. In some parts of southern Rwanda, a
household may have up to 14 crops growing in different fragments at
different seasons.... Recently, Blarel, et. al., noted that the costs of
consolidation in Rwanda may not exceed the benefits of using land
fragmented over the years in adopting to land scarcity.
425
A more open, transparent land market is desirable, but the coercive provisions
of the law could limit the evolved coping strategies of the poor. Pottier suggests
that the law may actually bar people who own less than one hectare from
registering their property.426 The government is supposed to provide compensation
for such confiscations, but it has not established clear standards for such payments.
Although the government says that it wants to increase tenure security,427 the new
law may increase insecurity for those who are most vulnerable. These prohibitions
and potentially vague use requirements place undesirable limits on the market for
2008); see also Pottier, supra note 293, at 510.
420. Organic Law No. 08/2005, supra note 419, at art. 5.
421. Id. at art. 31.
422. See id.
423. Id. at art. 20.
424. Id.
425. Musahara, supra note 293, at 11.
426. Pottier, supra note 293, at 521 (interpreting Arts. 62-65); see also Cramer, supra note 17, at
208-10 (discussing the English enclosure movement). The Rwandan land law may call the enclosure
movement to mind. Compare Pottier, supra note 293, and Cramer, supra note 17.
427. The government "sees increased security of tenure or rights of address to land, and more
effective land management, as important factors for the improvement of the agricultural sector and the
economy as a whole, helping to create the resources needed to reduce poverty and to consolidate peace
and social cohesion." Pottier, supra note 293, at 511.
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real property. Further, they might well promote more corruption if individuals
wish to consolidate land, or skirt these constraints and demands.
The new law may pose a special problem for women smallholders and their
children. Under the 2005 law, people are required to register all parcels of land in
the country; 428 however, women will face particular difficulties registering,
inheriting and acquiring rights to land. Although the law prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sex in relation to the ownership of or possession of rights over
land,429 Musahara argues that the law applies only to legally married women:
"those in long-term unmarried relations (who are numerous) are not covered.A
30
Only legally married women and their children are considered joint owners
capable of providing consent431 to the sale of jointly owned property; thus,
unmarried women may not be able to stop the sale of land by their partners. There
is uncertainty in the law regarding inheritance. For example, it is unclear if women
inherit via the inheritance law or via the land law, for example. 432 Also of concern
is the fact that custom still bars women from exercising their legal rights under the
Land Law. 4 33 Unless these issues are resolved, the Land Law may create special
difficulties for Rwanda's women, who do most of the agricultural work in the
country.
4 34
Security and clarity of tenure rights, whether customary or leasehold, are
essential both to avoid future conflicts and to encourage increased investment in
agriculture. However, the Land Law raises serious concerns, especially for women
and for uneducated farmers who might be dispossessed of their land. Surely, these
risks are undesirable in a nation with such high levels of poverty and such strong
dependence on agriculture as a livelihood.
IX. CONCLUSION
Despite strong economic growth and clearly beneficial liberalization efforts in
the coffee sector, much remains to be done to move Rwanda towards the VISION
2020 goal of becoming a stable, middle-income nation. Most Rwandans remain
desperately poor and many will bear the physical and psychological wounds of
genocide to their graves.
Yet there is reason for cautious optimism. The recent success of the nation's
specialty coffee industry means that the income of some smallholder farmers is
rising, and in turn, they are better able to feed themselves and their family, to send
children to school, to buy insurance, to repair or improve homes, and to do other
things that improve their standard of living. These benefits can be attributed to the
428. Organic Law No. 08/2005, supra note 419, at art. 30.
429. Id. at art. 4.
430. Musahara, supra note 293, at 12 (pointing out that "many couples are not legally married
because of the expense, and polygamous households are not legally recognized and their offspring are
not eligible to receive land as inheritance.").
431. Organic Law No. 08/2005, supra note 419, at art. 36.
432. Musahara, supra note 293, at 12.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 11.
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government's liberalization of the coffee sector, which allows smallholders to keep
more of the value of the product they grow. By freeing the coffee sector from the
heavy-handed involvement of the government, the post-genocide administrations
have given all farmers, Hutus and Tutsis, greater freedom to pursue entrepreneurial
opportunities.
To deal with the nations' tragic past, the Rwandan government has adopted a
multifaceted approach to reconciliation, including participation in the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, creation of the Gacaca Courts, the National Unity
and Reconciliation Commission, and a National Human Rights Commission.
These efforts will likely bring a sense of justice and healing to citizens. However,
these efforts have proved disappointing to many. What is perhaps most intriguing
about the rise of the country's specialty coffee sector is the unintended
consequence of this particular, broad-based liberalization: commercial activity
within the sector seems to be prompting the development of more positive attitudes
towards others. People who work together in the sector, at coffee cooperatives
particularly, are more willing than they were in the recent past to interact with
members of the other ethnic group. Trust levels are rising and people have more
positive attitudes towards reconciliation. Though additional research needs to be
done in this area, our exploratory survey work, combined with journalistic
evidence presented above, suggests that people working together in the specialty
coffee sector are finding an alternative path towards reconciliation.
Whether this kind of reconciliation is effective in the medium to long-term
remains to be seen; however, the experiences of workers in the coffee sector
strongly suggests that in post-conflict environments, governments should follow
Rwanda's lead and liberalize trade and promote commercial interaction between
former enemies. Such policy changes might just provide a cost-effective
complement to more traditional reconciliation efforts and help forge new, shared
identities.
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